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Abstract
In a set of six experiments, the relation between metacognition and associative memory
was explored. The purpose was to determine whether the metacognitive behaviors that are used
with item memory are also used with associative memory. Different memory systems have
separate underlying processes which can cause mnemonic strategies to only be useful for some
types of memory. People use metacognition to monitor and control their memory; however, it is
uncertain whether metacognitive monitoring and control are the same for different types of
memory. The research presented in this dissertation demonstrates the similarities and differences
between metacognitive behavior for item and associative memory.
In the first three experiments, presented in Chapter 2, several metamemory measures
were explored including: Judgments of Learning (JOLs), Confidence Judgments (CJs), study
time allocation, and response latencies. Each experiment used a different set of stimuli that are
known to have different effects on associative recognition memory, this provided an opportunity
to observe the outcome of the metacognitive measures under unique conditions. First, related and
unrelated word pairs were recognized equally well, however related pairs had higher hit rates and
higher false alarm rates compared to unrelated pairs. Participants allocated less study time to
related word pairs because they were more confident in their ability to remember them than
unrelated word pairs. Second, concrete word pairs had better discriminability, higher hit rates,
but lower false alarm rates than abstract word pairs. Therefore, concreteness facilitated
associative recognition memory, however participants showed no difference in confidence or
study time allocation for concrete and abstract word pairs. Third, picture pairs had better
discriminability, higher hit rates, but lower false alarm rates than unrelated word pairs. Similar to
concreteness, these results showed that pictures facilitated associative recognition memory.
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Despite the benefits of pictures and concreteness, participants showed no difference in
confidence for these types of stimuli which is theorized to be a result of differences in
metacognitive beliefs. Unlike previous findings which showed that concreteness is believed to
facilitate item memory, this belief does not apply to associative memory.
In the second set of three experiments, presented in Chapter 3, procedural changes were
made to facilitate study behavior. There were no changes in study behavior even after
participants gained experience with the experimental procedure. Similarly, they did not
incorporate the corrective feedback that they were given on their responses during the memory
test into their study strategies. Lastly, JOLs for concrete word pairs were more accurate when
they were collected after a short delay rather than immediately after each study pair. These
experiments demonstrate a consistent pattern of study behavior that is difficult to change without
explicit intervention. However, the finding that delaying the time when JOLs were collected had
a positive effect on their accuracy suggests that useful strategies that have been found for item
memory can similarly be useful for associative memory.

Keywords: metacognition, associative memory, recognition, judgments of learning,
confidence judgments, study time
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
The concept of introspection has been discussed by psychologists and philosophers for
many years. Introspection is the act of self-reflection on internal processes, such as thoughts,
emotions, or beliefs (www.merriam-webster.com). It can be performed for something as simple
as recalling the location of misplaced car keys to something as complex as evaluating your core
values and beliefs. It is also essential for keeping current knowledge updated. Metacognition is
an area of cognitive research that is based on the idea of introspection. Colloquially,
metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. Essentially, there is a higher order
process involved when someone reflects on their own cognitive behavior. Since the late 70’s,
metacognitive research has expanded to cover many areas of human behavior, for instance child
development (Hughes et al., 2018), teaching (Dunlosky et al., 2013), and memory (Kornell &
Bjork, 2009). The majority of the metacognitive literature has been focused on human memory,
however there is a gap concerning associative recognition memory. The main purpose of this
dissertation was to examine the relation between metacognition and associative recognition
memory.
When Flavell (1979) first coined the term metacognition his goal was to introduce a
concept that could explain how children learn from prior knowledge and previous experiences.
While working with children he noticed that they differed in their ability to reflect on their own
learning, where some children could explain why they gave a certain response on a task while
others could not. Flavell separated metacognitive behavior into two main components:
knowledge and experiences. Metacognitive knowledge, which contains the subcomponents task,
person, and strategy, affects decision making depending on the situation. For example,
metacognitive knowledge of intraindividual differences is the knowledge underlying someone’s
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personal beliefs about their own capabilities, which can have a positive or negative influence on
their behavior. Knowledge of different types also interact to have a combined effect on decision
making. Metacognitive experiences refer to past experiences with previous goals and actions.
These experiences can have many different effects, such as shaping strategy use, changing
metacognitive knowledge, or directing current actions or knowledge. Flavell suggested that
metacognitive experiences are often relied upon when a particular task has a high cognitive
demand (e.g., when planning is involved). These concepts remain important for research on child
development and learning (e.g., Mokharti & Reichard, 2002), and provide a general idea of how
metacognitive behavior can affect learning.
Interest in research on metacognition increased considerably in the 90’s, particularly
regarding memory. The subcategory of metacognition, referred to as metamemory, was unified
with the framework proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990). The main purpose of their
framework was to explain the role of metacognition within the generally well-established
memory model. According to their framework cognitive behavior works on a meta-level and an
object-level, where the meta-level is a dynamic model of the object-level. The levels interact by
two mechanisms: monitoring and control. Monitoring involves changes in the dynamic model of
the meta-level based on assessment of the object-level, this is often examined by self-reported
judgments of one’s own behavior. Control refers to changes in the object-level based on
feedback from the meta-level, this involves initiating an action, continuing an action, or
terminating an action.
Within the center of their model lies the object-level which in this case is the memory
model: an acquisition stage, a retention stage, and a retrieval stage (see Figure 1). Each of these
stages highlight different functions that are required when an individual performs a memory task.
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For example, the acquisition stage is when the characteristics of the to-be-learned material are
assessed on qualities like item difficulty. As another example, the retrieval stage is when a
response may be assessed on how likely it is to be correct. The framework was able to categorize
existing research on previously established metacognitive measures such as Ease-of-Learning
(EOLs)1 judgments, Judgments of Learning (JOLs), and study time allocation, and place them
into either a control or a monitoring role. For instance, EOLs are a self-report measure of how
difficult an item will be to learn (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Underwood, 1966). EOLs assess
metacognitive monitoring because they provide information to the dynamic model at the metalevel based on the state of learning. Alternatively, allocation of study time is a metacognitive
control process because it produces a plan for study behavior based on the current meta-level
model (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). The Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework has been a guide
for metacognitive research that followed because researchers have focused on exploring the
concepts of monitoring and control and the various metacognitive measures that fall within each
of those concepts.

1

See Appendix A for a list of abbreviations
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Figure 1
Framework for Metacognition

Monitoring

Ease-of-learning
judgments (EOL)

Judgments of
learning (JOL)
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learning

Control
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Response
output
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memory search

Note. A framework for metacognition, where the object-level includes the three stages of
memory (acquisition, retention, and retrieval) and the meta-level includes the monitoring (top)
and control (bottom) mechanisms. Adapted from Nelson and Narens (1990).

The Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework has been important in unifying the different
aspects of metacognition; however, it has a broad scope that covers the entirety of metamemory.
At a more specific level metacognitive researchers are interested in how people make judgments
and how they maintain control over their learning. The most popular approach for explaining
how people form metacognitive judgments was introduced by Asher Koriat in 1997 and was
centered on cue-utilization. The cue-utilization approach was based on previous findings on
JOLs, which are judgments made after some material has been studied and are an assessment of
how well that material will be remembered in the future (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). According
to the cue-utilization approach, “JOLs are based on the implicit application of rules or heuristics
in order to achieve a reasonable assessment of the probability that the information in question
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will be recalled or recognized at some later time” (Koriat, 1997, p. 350). These rules or heuristics
are based on cues that can be categorized into three different types: intrinsic, extrinsic, and
mnemonic (see Figure 2). Intrinsic cues are derived from the characteristics of the study material.
Extrinsic cues are from the conditions of the learning environment or the encoding strategy of
the learner. Mnemonic cues are internal subjective indicators, such as beliefs on how memory
works. One important distinction between these types of cues is that intrinsic and extrinsic cues
are made from analytic inferences, while mnemonic cues are made from nonanalytic, implicit
inferences. Regardless of how cues are categorized, the metacognitive field has continued to
place an emphasis on the importance of cues when making any type of metacognitive judgment.
Current research on metacognitive judgments is focused on the accuracy and usefulness of cues
in relation to the behavioral outcome being measured (e.g., the accuracy of JOLs at predicting
memory performance on a recall test).
Figure 2
Cue-utilization Approach to Metacognitive Judgments
Analytical inference
Intrinsic cue

Non-analytical inference
Mnemonic cue

Extrinsic cue

JOL

Note. Two types of cues (Intrinsic and Extrinsic) are made based on an analytical approach,
while the third type of cue (Mnemonic) is a based on an experiential, nonanalytical approach and
is typically used after intrinsic or extrinsic cues have already been considered. Adapted from
Koriat (1997).
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Over the last few decades of research on metacognitive judgments it has been found that
the interaction between cues and judgments varies under different conditions. The next section
will review the three types of metacognitive measures that are relevant to the research presented
in this dissertation.
Metamemory Measures
There are many different types of judgments that have been examined throughout the
metamemory literature that each covers a specific aspect of memory. This section will focus on
the following three measures: JOLs, CJs, and reaction time. All the experiments presented in this
dissertation included all three of these measures; each one captures metacognitive behavior at
different time points and in different ways. JOLs were recorded during study and are selfassessments of ongoing learning. CJs were recorded during test and are self-assessments of
memory accuracy. Reaction time was recorded throughout the entire procedure and is an implicit
measure of behavior. In the following subsections each measure will be reviewed in terms of key
findings, important cues, and influence on memory.
Judgments of Learning
JOLs were one of the earliest metacognitive measures introduced and have remained one
of the most popular measures used in metacognitive research (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). An
example of a JOL prompt would be, “How confident are you that you will remember the item
you just studied at a later time?” Subjects would then indicate a rating, typically on a 0-100 scale
(sometimes with 20-point increments), where a higher rating indicates greater confidence. JOLs
are often collected after the subject has completed a single trial – these are referred to as itemlevel or immediate JOLs. Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) indirectly introduced JOLs when they
initially wanted to measure individual differences in the ability to detect differences between
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relatedness in word pairs. They were the first to ask participants to rate their likelihood of
remembering pairs of items using a 1-7 point scale, where a higher rating indicated greater
confidence in the likelihood of remembering a pair. Since then, JOLs have been similarly used to
investigate whether people can detect other differences between stimuli.
In general, JOLs have been shown to be highly sensitive to stimulus manipulations. The
memory literature has a long history of examining the conditions in which the characteristics of
stimuli affect memory performance. One example of this is word frequency (WF), which refers
to how often a word is used or seen throughout language use. A common finding in the memory
literature is that low frequency words are recognized more easily than high frequency words
(Glanzer & Adams, 1985). WF has not been investigated nearly as much in the metacognitive
literature, however a meta-analysis found a small but reliable effect of WF on JOLs (Fiacconi &
Dollois, 2020), where JOLs for high frequency words were more accurate than JOLs for low
frequency words. Studies included in the analysis contained either recognition or recall test
formats. They observed a large variance in effect sizes between studies, indicating that there are
likely other factors contributing to this WF effect. More research is needed on the WF effect on
JOLs; however, these initial reports serve as an example to demonstrate that JOLs have a reliable
sensitivity to differences in stimuli.
Another example of a stimulus characteristic that has been extensively studied in the
memory literature is concreteness. It has been repeatedly shown that concrete words are
remembered better than abstract words (e.g., Hockley & Cristi, 1996; Paivio & Csapo, 1969).
Likewise, a consistent concreteness effect has been found in JOLs, where concrete words are
given higher JOLs than abstract words (Begg et al., 1989). This effect is a result of
metacognitive beliefs about the effect of concreteness on memory (Witherby & Tauber, 2017).
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When Witherby and Tauber (2017) had participants estimate the likelihood of remembering
concrete or abstract words in a hypothetical experiment, participants predicted that more
concrete words would be remembered than abstract words. Thus, in the absence of any actual
influence of concreteness on learning participants had a belief that concreteness benefits
memory. Additionally, in a follow up experiment when participants were asked to give pre-study
JOLs (collected before each word was studied) or immediate JOLs (collected after each word
was studied) they gave higher JOLs to concrete words than abstract words. Both experiments
support the idea that when participants notice differences in stimulus characteristics, they either
have an existing belief on how that difference will affect their ability to remember the stimuli or
they form a belief on how it will impact their memory.
The last instance of word characteristics affecting memory performance that will be
reviewed here briefly is the associative strength, or relatedness, between word pairs. Up until this
point, the emphasis has been on differences inherit in the characteristics of single words,
however, one of the primary goals of the current dissertation was to examine metamemory for
word pairs. In a set of experiments, Undorf and Erdfelder (2015) found that highly related word
pairs (month-year) were given higher JOLs compared to unrelated words pairs (bus-score). Also,
related pairs were studied for a less amount of time, took less study-test trials before being
successfully recalled, and overall were recalled more than unrelated pairs. This study serves as
an introduction to the idea that the association between word pairs, which has a long history in
the memory literature, has effects on metamemory as well.
The basis of metacognitive judgments, like JOLs, are typically explained by the cueutilization approach. However, Mueller, Dunlosky, and Tauber (2016) proposed an addition to
this approach for how people use cues to make JOLs, which they termed the analytic-processing
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(AP) theory. According to AP theory people take a problem-solving approach when making
judgments, where cues are subject to personal beliefs on how they affect memory performance.
This theory has been supported by research on metacognitive illusions. One such illusion is that
identical paired items (cow-cow) are better recalled than related (pasture-cow) or unrelated pairs
(ace-cow). Mueller et al., (2016) found that identical paired items had greater JOLs than related
pairs, but they did not differ in actual cued recall. More importantly in terms of AP theory is that
the relation between JOLs and recall was not mediated by processing fluency.
Processing fluency refers to the ease of which an item is processed when it is studied.
One way processing fluency has been measured is by study time, where less study time indicates
faster processing. Study time and JOLs have been shown to be negatively related, where lower
study time is accompanied by higher JOLs. This relation has typically led to the conclusion that
processing fluency is used as a cue for making metacognitive judgments. However, as Mueller
and his colleagues (2016) found, processing fluency did not mediate the relation between JOLs
and recall performance. In fact, they found in a previous study that when participants were asked
to judge a hypothetical situation where identical pairs and related pairs were studied, they still
gave higher JOLs to identical pairs demonstrating that in the absence of the effects of processing
fluency this illusion still remained (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013). When participants were
asked to provide a reason for their judgments, they indicated a belief that identical pairs are
easier to remember and that the repetition of the same word in an identical pair would also make
them easier to remember.
While AP theory does well to explain how cues can be used in the absence of the effect
of factors, like processing fluency, there are still many other examples where processing fluency
best explains the findings on metacognitive judgments. A frequently cited example is by Rhodes
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and Castel (2008) who demonstrated the font size illusion, where words in larger font were given
higher JOLs than words in smaller font but font size had no effect on the number of words
recalled. Others measures of processing fluency, like study time (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015) and
trials to acquisition (Witherby & Tauber, 2017), have also been used to determine if there are any
mediation effects. The results have been mixed, for example Undorf and Erdfelder (2015) found
that self-paced study time was a mediating factor for the effect of relatedness on JOLs. In
contrast, Witherby and Tauber (2017) found no mediating effect of self-paced study on the effect
of concreteness on JOLs. It remains unclear what role processing fluency has on people’s
decision making when it comes to metacognitive judgments or how it may interact with other
potential cues.
Confidence Judgments
The second type of metacognitive measure that will be reviewed is confidence
judgments. These are also referred to as Retroactive Confidence Judgments (RCJs) because they
involve a person assessing past responses on a memory test. A general CJ prompt would be,
“How confident are you that your response was correct?” Typically, they are collected using a 010 scale, with a higher score indicating greater confidence. In terms of the Nelson and Narens’
(1990) framework, CJs are a measure of memory retrieval, specifically the output of response.
Therefore, the information available to a person making a CJ will be different than someone
making a JOL. The literature on CJs has investigated the factors that affect people’s ratings.
A finding from early studies (e.g., Costermans et al., 1992), that has been replicated
numerous times, is that CJs are often moderate to highly accurate. Compared to a similar
judgment like Feeling-of-Knowing (FOK), where participants are asked to make a judgment on
how likely they would remember an item that they cannot recall at that time, CJs are much better
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correlated to accuracy (Siedlecka et al., 2019). Both judgments are prompted during test and
after making a response to an item, but FOKs are only made when information is not available
whereas CJs are made regardless of whether a response was correct or not. This difference in
available information allows people to make accurate CJs but not FOKs.
From a cue-utilization perspective, CJs can be made using different cues than those
available to other metacognitive measures like JOLs or FOKs. One such cue, which is highly
predictive of correctness on a recall memory test is retrieval processing or fluency (Siedlecka et
al., 2019). This refers to the ability to retrieve the memory trace of a studied item as well as the
speed with which the response comes to mind. The high accuracy of CJs can be more useful than
other metacognitive measures for learning strategies like selecting items for re-study (Robey et
al., 2017). Judgments like FOKs which are made at the time when recall of the correct response
is not available are made based on partial accessibility to the response or the cue fluency (Chua
& Solinger, 2015).
Reaction Time Measures
One alternative measure to judgments, which is not exclusive to metacognition, is
reaction time. Typically, reaction time measures are collected in conjunction with other
measures, such as JOLs, to compare explicit responses to implicit behavior. For example,
research interested in how people decide how long to study different items will compare
judgments of item difficulty to the length of study time per item in order to examine whether
differences in judgments are accompanied by actual differences in behavior (Hines et al., 2015).
Research on study time allocation has advanced many important ideas for education and learning
environments, such as the factors that affect how long we study different information (Dunlosky
& Thiede, 1998), why we choose to study certain items over others (Metcalfe, 2002), and how
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well study behavior corresponds to self-report judgments, like JOLs. Similar to other
metacognitive measures, study time allocation is affected by cues, metacognitive beliefs,
expectations, constraints placed by the experimenter, etc. (Bjork et al., 2013). The factors that
affect metacognitive judgments can have similar effects on study time allocation, but under
certain conditions can have much different outcomes. Participants may identify items as being
more difficult by giving them lower JOLs but then choose to study these difficult items for a
shorter amount of time because they know that studying the less difficult items will result in a
better overall performance on a future memory test (Son & Metcalfe, 2000).
Another type of reaction time measure is response time or latency. Similar to study time,
response latency measures implicit behavior and is collected either when a response is made or
after a response has been made. According to the Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework,
reaction time measures are similar to measures like CJs or FOKs because they are influenced by
cues available at test. Factors such as retrieval fluency have similar effects on reaction time as
they do on CJs, where items that are retrieved more quickly at test are associated with greater
confidence (Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). As mentioned previously, fluency can lead to illusions of
competence (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) and in the case of reaction time this has been found to
mislead people into thinking that the faster a response comes to mind the more likely it will be
recalled in the future (Benjamin et al., 1998).
The review of JOLs, CJs, and reaction time measures so far has been focused on their
relation to memory in general. However, because the main focus of the research presented in this
dissertation is on metamemory measures for associative recognition it is important to review the
literature specific to this relation. Before examining these studies, a brief review of associative
memory is presented in the next section.
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Associative Memory
The term associative memory refers to two bits of information (which will be referred to
as items) and the connection between those two bits (Humphreys, 1976). Forming associations is
important when forming knowledge structures in memory. The main purpose of studying
associative memory is to understand the mechanisms that allow us to form a connection between
two items and how this connection is stored and retrieved. This differs from other aspects of our
memory system because it is not sufficient to remember a single item, or even multiple items, it
is necessary to remember which items are connected. Memory for associations can be examined
with cued recall where one member of the pair is presented at test and participants are asked to
recall the paired item, or with a test of associative recognition.
The current study was focused on recognition memory for associative information using
an associative recognition test. For an associative recognition memory task, the way researchers
can ensure participants have to rely on their associative memory and not their item memory, is to
use a list of pairs with both intact and rearranged pairs (Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007). Intact pairs
are simply two items that were previously paired together during study, these are considered old
pairs. Rearranged pairs are created by a taking an item from one study pair and combining it with
an item from another pair, this creates a new pair composed of two old items. When participants
are tested on intact and rearranged pairs it is not sufficient to rely on their memory for the items
because both intact (old) and rearranged (new) pairs consist of two old items, they must also
recognize which items were paired together (i.e., associative information). Thus, associative
recognition provides a relatively pure test of memory for associations (Humphreys, 1976)
compared to cued recall which requires retrieval of both item and associative information to be
successful.
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For associative recognition memory, a signal detection approach can be applied not only
to each individual item but also to the connection between two items. When a participant is
asked to identify whether they recognize a pair from a list as being previously studied, this
decision involves considering the memory strength of the association against a subjective
threshold. If the strength of the memory for the association does not pass the threshold then the
participant would consider that pair as “new”, meaning a pair that they do not recognize as being
previously studied. The purpose of recognition memory research is to identify the factors that
influence this signal detection system.
In 2002, Yonelinas reviewed the popular models of recognition based on a dual process
approach. In general, these models suggest that there are two components underlying the process
of making a recognition decision. The first component is called familiarity and can be defined as
a feeling of having previously encountered an item. Familiarity is similar to (or in some models
be a proxy for) the memory strength assessed by a threshold criterion, mentioned previously,
since it is also a subjective component used to identify an item as old or new. The second
component is called recollection and can be defined as knowing whether an item was previously
encountered based on recalled information about a previous study event. Yonelinas concluded
that the literature shows many ways these two processes differ (processing speed,
neuroanatomical substrates, support of novel learning, etc.), however what remains uncertain is
what model best describes the relation between these two processes and how they function
together to form the basis of our recognition memory.
A dual process model explains the difference between item and associative memory.
When using associative memory people can use recollection (or a recall-like process) to verify
intact pairs by recalling the association. Similarly, for rearranged pairs people can recall the
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association for one or both of the words in the pair in order to correctly reject the pair as an old
item. Rotello and Heit (2000) referred to this process as recall-to-reject, suggesting a fast process
(familiarity) is used initially, but if this is unsuccessful then a slower recall-like process is used
to provide mismatching information in order to correctly reject a new item. Hockley and Consoli
(1999) also found support for a dual process theory of associative memory when they used
Tulving’s (1985) remember-know paradigm to compare recognition for item and associative
information for random word pairs. They found that more remember responses, which are made
when details of a prior experience are able to be recalled (i.e., recollection), were given for
associative recognition than item recognition, which had more know responses, which are made
when details of prior experience are not recallable (i.e., familiarity). The accuracy of know
responses was above chance for item recognition but at chance for associative recognition, which
supports the idea that associative recognition requires an additional process to be accurate.
The traditional view of recognition memory emphasizes the differences between item and
associative information which leads to a benefit for associative memory when a recall processes
is used. A novel approach to analyzing item and associative information considers how these two
can be considered similar under certain circumstances. This theory, called unitization, is that
once two items are paired together frequently enough they come to be viewed as a single item. A
direct prediction from this is that a unitized pair functions similar to a single item. For example,
Park and Yonelinas (2015) created two types of word pairs, one with a low level of unitization
and one with a high level of unitization. The low unitization pairs were created by having
participants study two words in the context of a sentence. The high unitization pairs were created
by having participants study two words put together into a new compound word, along with a
novel definition. They found that highly unitized word pairs increased associative recognition
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memory, but had no effect on item memory. Additionally, recollection and familiarity
parameters in their model suggested that the benefit to associative memory was more so due to
an increase in familiarity-based responding. This supports the claim that unitized pairs act like
single items.
Another way to examine the level of unitization is by manipulating the degree of preexperimental familiarity between item pairs. Ahmad and Hockley (2014) varied familiarity by
comparing compound words to non-compound word pairs. For example, the compound word
pair (candle-stick) was composed from the compound word candlestick, the non-compound word
pair (door-pepper) was composed of the two unrelated words door and pepper. When they
compared participants’ recognition memory for compound word pairs to non-compound word
pairs using a yes or no associative recognition test they found a concordant effect where
compound word pairs had higher hit rates, but also higher false alarm rates compared to noncompound word pairs. This concordant effect is what they referred to as the compound word
effect. They suggested that the reason for the compound word effect is that compound word pairs
increase the use of familiarity-based responding, which in turn increases the rate of old
responses. The inflated level of familiarity from compound word pairs led to both an increase in
hit rates and a decrease in correct rejection rates.
Associative Recognition Memory from a Metacognitive Perspective
The main purpose of this dissertation was to use metacognitive measures to examine
associative recognition memory. Specifically, whether the typical findings from the
metacognitive literature on item information was the same for associative information. There is a
gap in the literature where associative recognition memory has not been examined with
metacognitive measures to nearly the same extent as item recognition memory. Although there
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are many studies that have use paired associates as stimuli, or have looked at pair relatedness,
there have been very few studies that consider the role metacognition has within an associative
recognition memory model. Therefore, the research presented in this dissertation was exploratory
in nature and had many questions that were not initially easy to predict. For example, are JOLs,
CJs, study time and response time differentially affected by the characteristics of word pairs? In
this section the few studies that have at least partially examined these or similar questions will be
briefly considered.
It should be noted that one area of the associative memory literature that has focused on
the impact of metacognition on associative memory is the aging literature. There is a large
amount of research dedicated to the concept of aging differences in associative memory between
younger and older adults, specifically, that younger adults do better in associative memory tasks
compared to older adults (for a review see Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). A well-documented
finding is that these age differences are not a result of poor associative memory in older adults,
but rather that older adults implement less effective metacognitive strategies or are negatively
affected by incorrect metacognitive beliefs about their own memory abilities (Cavallini et al.,
2003; Dunlosky et al., 2003; Hertzog et al., 2002). It has been demonstrated that when older
adults are given instructions to use effective learning strategies, like using imagery to form
associations, they perform equally as well as younger adults (Emanuel Robinson et al., 2006;
Price et al., 2008). While this area of research has important implications for our understanding
of associative memory during a person’s lifespan, it does not explore the intricate aspects of
associative recognition memory that is the main focus of the current research.
Research by Hertzog and his colleagues has examined associative recognition memory
with the purpose of examining a multiple-cue utilization approach. In a 2009 study they had
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participants study word pairs and included numerous metacognitive measures throughout the
procedure (Hines et al.). They were interested in how metacognitive measures such as JOLs and
CJs influenced decisions of study time allocation in a two trial associative recognition task. They
had participants complete two study-test trials, where they studied the same 60 unrelated word
pairs in both trials. During the first study-test phase participants gave immediate JOLs (0-100
scale) for each pair at study, and CJs (also on a 0-100 scale) for each pair on the yes or no
associative recognition test which was composed of half intact pairs and half rearranged pairs.
Response time was also measured for each item on the test. They found that both intact and
rearranged pairs were highly accurate, but intact pairs were responded to more quickly and were
given higher and more accurate CJs than rearranged pairs. For intact pairs, JOLs were weakly
correlated to recognition accuracy. Additionally, CJs were negatively correlated with study time
at test 2, where items given higher CJs were studied less than items given lower CJs. These
results give an initial idea on how metacognitive judgments may be utilized differently for
associative recognition memory than other tests of memory, like cued recall.
These results were partially replicated in two follow up studies (Hertzog et al., 2013;
Hines et al., 2015). The focus of the follow up studies was more on the effect of memory for past
tests (MPT) on JOLs, however a couple of important findings remained consistent with the
previous 2009 study. Both follow up studies used the same unrelated word pairs as Hines et al.
(2009) and had participants give JOLs and CJs for two study-test trials, where the stimulus list
remained identical for both trials. JOLs were lower than recognition accuracy, substantially so in
the first trial, but overall JOLs were weakly correlated with recognition accuracy. Also, CJs were
generally high and positively correlated with recognition accuracy. Interestingly, JOLs were
affected by MPT, where trial 2 JOLs were correlated with trial 1 recognition accuracy. However,
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this was not the only influence on trial 2 JOLs, they were also influenced independently by trial 1
CJs and trial 2 study time. These studies demonstrate a promising multiple-cue approach to
understanding how JOLs are formed.
Ultimately, the main findings from Hines et al., (2009) have the most relation to the
research presented in this dissertation, however the lack of reporting hits, false alarms, and some
discrimination measure (e.g., d’), makes it difficult to interpret the results in terms of recognition
memory. It still remains an important study to examine and will be relevant later when
interpreting the results of the research that will be presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
Introduction to Experiments
The studies presented in this dissertation were designed to fill the gap in the literature on
metacognitive behavior in relation to associative recognition memory. In a set of six
experiments, the general procedure was designed to explore multiple metacognitive measures for
different types of pairs of items that have been known to affect associative recognition memory
performance. Participants were asked to study a list of paired associates, usually word pairs, and
during study they were asked to give a JOL for each pair. A yes or no associative recognition
memory test followed the study phase, which was composed of half intact and half rearranged
pairs and participants were asked to give a CJ after each response. Reaction times were recorded
throughout the entire procedure so that study time allocation and response latencies could also be
examined.
Experiment 1, while serving as an introduction to this exploratory procedure, was also
designed to replicate the compound word effect in associative recognition memory (Ahmad &
Hockley, 2014). The result is a concordant effect, where compared to non-compound word pairs,
compound word pairs have higher hit rates but also higher false alarm rates and similar
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discriminability. Experiment 1 provided initial data on how compound word pairs, which differ
in pre-experimental associative strength compared to non-compound word pairs, affect JOLs,
study time allocation, response latencies, and CJs. The primary difference in Experiment 2 was
that the stimuli changed to concrete and abstract word pairs which have been found to result in a
mirror effect, where concrete word pairs have higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and better
discriminability compared to abstract word pairs (Hockley, 1994). The stimuli were once again
changed in Experiment 3, this time to picture pairs and unrelated word pairs, where picture pairs
have higher hit rates and better discriminability compared to unrelated word pairs but no
difference in false alarm rates (Hockley, 2008). These three experiments not only provide a
behavioural replication of the effects of different types of stimuli on associative recognition
performance, they also examine metamemory measures for associative recognition memory
where hit rates, false alarm rates, and discriminability have varying outcomes.
The subsequent three experiments attempted to manipulate metacognitive control by
exploring different study conditions. Experiment 4 introduced a second study-test trial in order to
examine whether practice would influence participants to reconsider how differences between
pairs affects recognition memory at test. Similarly, Experiment 5 looked at whether feedback
given on the first test would affect behavior on the second study-test trial. Lastly, Experiment 6
explored a well-known finding in the metacognitive literature that delaying the interval between
when an item is finished being studied and when a JOL is given, results in more accurate JOLs.
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Chapter 2: Experiments I-III
Experiment 1
An integral part of our memory system is storing connections between pieces of
information, such as a face with a name or a word with its definition. Previous research has
covered many aspects of how our associative memory works, from the way we initially encode
information to the way we maintain and store information, to the mechanisms responsible for
retrieving information from memory (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002). Recently, there have
been new findings from research on metamemory that, at times, has challenged the way we have
viewed existing memory systems, including associative memory (e.g., Nelson & Narens, 1990).
However, since the area of metacognition is still relatively new there is still work that needs to be
done before fully understanding the role metamemory has within a model of human memory.
One of the goals of the research reported in this dissertation was to explore one particular aspect
of memory, associative recognition, and how it is affected by metamemory behavior.
The general procedure of all of the experiments reported in this dissertation reflect the
exploratory nature of this research. When designing the first experiment the aim was to include
multiple metamemory measures within a typical associative recognition memory task in order to
examine metacognitive behavior at different time points. Additionally, this design would allow
for an analysis of the correlation between different metamemory measures which may offer
insight on whether they correspond to similar or different aspects of memory. Ultimately, we
included four measures of metamemory: JOLs, study time, CJs, and response latencies. JOLs and
study time were both collected or measured during the first phase of the experiments when
participants were asked to study a list of pairs of items. JOLs were collected as a measure of
study behavior that was expected to reflect the nature of the material being studied, meaning that
if certain pairs were more difficult to study then the JOLs would reflect this difference between
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pairs (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). Study time was a similar measure, however it is more of an
implicit measure that does not always correspond to self-report ratings (Metcalfe, 2002). CJs and
response latencies were collected during the second phase of the experiments when participants
were asked to decide whether a pair of items were previously presented at study or not. Like
JOLs, CJs are self-report measures of behavior, but unlike JOLs they do not measure confidence
in future performance but rather performance on an item after it has been tested. Lastly, response
latencies are a similar reaction time measure as study time, but correspond to behavior at test.
In general, there were a few predicted outcomes for the metamemory measures that were
expected based on previous research. First, it was expected that JOLs and CJs would reflect a
difference in the stimulus characteristics of the word pairs. For instance, in the first experiment
one prediction was that participants would give higher JOLs to compound word pairs compared
to non-compound word pairs. This is based on previous studies where differences in the
characteristics of stimuli influenced the direction of JOLs (e.g., Witherby & Tauber, 2017).
Second, JOLs were expected to be quite low in terms of their correlation to actual test
performance, while CJs were expected to have a moderate to high correlation to test
performance. This was based on research on JOLs (Tauber et al., 2015) and CJs (Siedlecka et al.,
2019), which have been found to have noticeably different absolute accuracies. Third, study time
allocation and response latencies were expected to have a negative relation with JOLs and CJs,
respectively. For instance, if an item was given a high JOL it would be studied for a less amount
of time compared to an item that was given a low JOL. This prediction was based on the
literature on study time allocation (e.g., Metcalfe, 2002). As for the relation among the different
measures, it was too difficult to predict what to expect therefore this remained an open question
when it came to the analysis.
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In terms of associative memory, the central purpose of the first three experiments
included in this chapter was to examine differences in stimuli that had relatively consistent
effects on associative recognition performance. The three experiments included in this chapter
each used a different set of stimuli that have been previously shown to have different outcomes
in terms of hit rates, false alarm rates, or discriminability. The first experiment was designed to
replicate the concordant Compound Word effect (Ahmad & Hockley, 2014). It was expected that
compound word pairs would have higher hit rates, higher false alarm rates, and similar
discriminability compared to non-compound word pairs. Then, in our second experiment we
changed the stimuli to concrete and abstract word pairs because they have been found to produce
a mirror effect. Specifically, concrete word pairs were expected to have higher hit rates, lower
false alarm rates, and better discriminability compared to abstract word pairs. Lastly, our third
experiment once again changed the stimuli to unrelated pairs of pictures and words, which was
expected to produce a unique pattern of results from the previous two experiments based on
previous work on the picture superiority effect in associative recognition (Hockley, 2008).
Picture pairs were expected to have higher hit rates, equal false alarm rates, and better
discriminability compared to unrelated word pairs. By examining three examples where there is a
noticeable difference in performance on an associative recognition task, it was of interest to see
whether the accompanying metacognitive behavior would also be noticeably different.
As mentioned previously, one of the primary purposes of Experiment 1 was to replicate
the procedure of Ahmad and Hockley (2014). In particular, their first experiment where they had
participants study both compound word pairs (air-stream) and non-compound word pairs (deaththing), then tested them using a yes or no associative recognition test. One immediate difference
for our experiment was that we used three types of word pairs: compound word pairs (candle-
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wax), high strength word pairs (below-above), and low strength word pairs (brother-sibling). The
strength between word pairs refers to the forward associative strength as measured by word
association norms (Nelson et al., 1998), where greater strength indicates a higher likelihood that
the left side word will produce the right side word if presented as a cue. We decided to include
high strength and low strength word pairs as oppose to unrelated word pairs, which were used by
Ahmad and Hockley (2014), in order to test whether word pairs that had some level of preexperimental association would produce a concordant effect.
The other main purpose of Experiment 1 was to introduce a number of metacognitive
measures into an associative recognition task. While participants were studying the list of word
pairs they were asked to make a JOL after each pair, indicating an immediate prediction of
prospective memory performance. Also during the study phase, participants were allowed to
study the word pairs for as long as they wanted, this allowed us to record the amount of time
participants took to study each word pair as a measure of study time allocation. Participants were
not told that study time would be recorded so this measure is relatively free of bias or demand
characteristics. During the test phase participants were asked to make a CJ after each response,
indicating an immediate measure of performance. Once again, we allowed them as much time as
they wanted before making a response and recorded the response latencies.
Method
Participants
Thirty-nine participants took part in Experiment 1, this sample size is comparable to other
previous studies on recognition memory (e.g., Ahmad & Hockley, 2014). For the three
experiments presented in this chapter the only requirements for participation was that English
was a first language and that they were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Wilfrid
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Laurier University. No basic demographic information (age and gender) was collected from the
participants; however, we are not aware of any effects of age or gender differences in young
adults that affect recognition memory. For Experiment 1, one participant did not complete the
entire procedure; therefore, their data was discarded. Two participants were excluded for failing
to follow instructions. We used a corrected recognition score (hit rate – false alarm rate) to
determine exclusion from further analysis, which resulted in data from four participants being
excluded from Experiment 1 because they had low corrected recognition scores (<= 0.15). The
remaining data from 32 participants was used for the analysis of Experiment 1. Regardless of
their inclusion in the data analysis, all participants received course credit in exchange for their
participation.
Materials
The experiment was conducted on an IBM-compatible PC computer with a 17-in. LCD
monitor housed in an individual cubicle and using SuperLab 5.0 software (Cedrus, San Pedro,
CA). There were a total of 114 word pairs, presented in Gills Sans MT, style-Regular, colorblack, size 28 font on a white background, with 10 spaces in between the two words. There were
three types of word pairs: Compound, High Strength, and Low Strength. The Compound pairs
were comprised of 38 word pairs taken from a combination of Jones (2005) and Ahmad and
Hockley (2014). The High Strength and Low Strength pairs were comprised of 76 word pairs
which were created from the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998) word association norms.
From the database we adopted the following criteria: High Strength pairs had a minimum
forward association value of .20 and Low Strength pairs had a forward association value greater
than 0 but a maximum of .02 (see Appendix B for list of word pairs).
Procedure
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Each participant completed the experiment individually in a small cubicle. The
experiment began with an introduction informing participants that they would be asked to study a
list of word pairs for an upcoming memory test. They were told that they could study each pair
for as long as they wanted, and after each pair they would be prompted to give a JOL. They were
told to use the keyboard to make their responses and could begin when they were ready.
The study phase was composed of 114 trials. For each trial participants studied a word
pair and then gave a JOL rating for that pair. Each trial was self-paced, participants pressed the
spacebar when they were finished studying a pair and again when they were satisfied with the
JOL rating they made. A study time measure in milliseconds (ms), was made by recording the
time a pair first appeared on screen to when the spacebar was pressed. Participants were not
explicitly informed that we were recording how long they took to complete different parts of the
experiment. Following a word pair, participants were prompted to give a JOL rating between 1100, 1 indicating, “You do not think you will remember the word pair at all”, and 100 indicating,
“You will definitely remember the word pair”. They were encouraged to make use of the entire
range of the scale. A display box showed their response and allowed them to make any
corrections. Of the 114 study trials, three trials at the beginning of study and three at the end of
study were used to account for recency and primacy effects and were therefore not analyzed. The
remaining 108 trials were composed of 36 trials for each of the Compound, High Strength, and
Low Strength pair types. The study list was presented in a completely random order. Participants
were not explicitly informed about the different types of word pairs.
The test phase began after participants confirmed with the experimenter that they had
completed the study phase. They were then informed that they would be given a memory test on
the word pairs that they had just studied. For the test, their task was to indicate whether a word
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pair had been presented during the study phase, responding with the “s” key to indicate yes or the
“n” key to indicate no. They were also informed that they would be asked for a CJ after each
response and that the CJ would be from 1-10, 1 indicating, “You have no idea whether your
response is correct or not”, and 10 indicating, “You are absolutely certain that your response is
correct”. The test began immediately after the instructions were given.
The test phase was composed of 72 trials. Each trial was self-paced and contained a word
pair and a CJ rating. The 72 trials were composed of 24 trials for each of the Compound, High
Strength, and Low Strength pair types. For each of these 24 trials, half were intact pairs
(appeared the same as on the study list) and half were rearranged pairs. Rearranged pairs were
made by using two study list pairs, the left-side word of one pair was used with the right-side
word of another pair; left-right side location and pair type remained the same (i.e., a new
Compound word pair was made from two previous Compound pairs). The test list was presented
in a completely random order which was different for each participant. Response latencies were
measure by recording the interval between a test pair first appearing on screen and when a
response key was pressed.
Results
Recognition Performance
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be
found in Table 1. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 3 (Pair Type: Compound vs.
High Strength vs. Low Strength) repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)2 with
proportion of old responses as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type
(F(1, 31) = 290.75, MSe = 0.05, p < .001, η2p = .9) with HR being greater than FAR, a main

2

For all three experiments, if a repeated measures ANOVA was used then the assumption of sphericity was tested
using Mauchly’s Test for sphericity and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was made if that assumption was violated.
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effect of Pair Type (F(2, 62) = 25.78, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η2p = .45), and no significant
interaction (F(2, 62) < 1).
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for
Experiment 1.
Pair Type

Compound

High Strength

Low Strength

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

HR

.87 (.09)

.86 (.11)

.71 (.16)

FAR

.32 (.13)

.31 (.16)

.20 (.16)

d’

1.76 (.75)

1.72 (.70)

1.58 (.84)

C

-.34 (.31)

-.35 (.29)

.16 (.36)

To further analyze the main effect of Pair Type, a post-hoc analysis was done using
paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The tests showed that
Compound pairs did not differ from High Strength pairs (t(31) = 0.12, p = 1, d = 0.02),
Compound pairs were greater than Low strength pairs (t(31) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 1.02), and
High strength pairs were greater than Low Strength pairs (t(31) = 6.4, p < .001, d = 1.13). The
pattern of means is consistent with a concordant effect (higher HR and higher FAR) when
comparing Compound pairs to Low Strength pairs and when comparing High Strength pairs to
Low Strength pairs (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3
Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 1. The error bars represent
standard deviations of the means.

A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was performed to examine the differences in d’
according to the Pair Type. No significant differences (χ2(2) = 0.39, p = .82)3 were found among
the three Pair Types (Compound, High Strength, and Low Strength). This is in line with the
concordant effect mentioned previously, as the decrease in both HR and FAR for Low Strength
pairs compared to both Compound and High Strength pairs resulted in equal d’ values. To
examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if they differed from zero and found that
Compound pairs (t(31) = -6.12, p < .001, d = 1.08), and High Strength pairs (t(31) = -6.79, p <

3

An initial one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(2, 93) < 1), however the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was
used because the data violated the normality assumption.
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.001, d = 1.2) had a significant liberal bias, while Low Strength pairs had a significant
conservative bias (t(31) = 2.57, p = .015, d = 0.45).
Metacognitive Measures
Study
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 2.
We ran a one-way ANOVA with Pair Type (Compound vs. High Strength vs. Low Strength) as a
within-subjects factor and mean JOL as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect of
Pair type (F(2, 93) = 5.78, MSe = 363.8, p = .004, η2p = .11). A post-hoc analysis using a Tukey
Test was done on all planned pairwise comparisons which showed that Compound pairs were
greater than Low Strength pairs (p = .026), High strength pairs were greater than Low Strength
pairs (p = .006), and Compound pairs did not differ from High Strength pairs (p = .86). The same
ANOVA was run on mean Study Time4; there was no significant effect of Pair Type (F(2, 93) <
1).
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec.) by Pair
Type for Experiment 1.
Measure

JOLs
Study Time

Compound

High Strength

Low Strength

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

63.49 (19.67)

65.99 (18.12)

50.87 (19.40)

4.51 (3.04)

4.55 (3.26)

5.45 (3.28)

Extreme outliers were identified – and removed – using boxplot methods as values above Q3 + (1.5xIQR) or below
Q1 – (1.5xIQR), where Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles, respectively, and IQR is the interquartile range.
For all reaction time analyses in all 3 experiments outliers were identified with this criteria and subsequently
removed.
4
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Test
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in
Table 3. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 3
(Pair Type: Compound vs. High Strength vs. Low Strength) repeated measures ANOVA with
mean CJ as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(2.03, 26.36) =
13.82, MSe = 5.1, p < .001, η2p = .52), a main effect of Pair Type (F(2, 26) = 6.08, MSe = 0.77, p
= .007, η2p = .32), and no significant interaction (F(3.53, 45.93) = 1.15, MSe = 1.36, p = .34, η2p
= .08).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for metacognitive measures at test (mean CJs and Response Time in sec) by
Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 1.

Pair Type

Hits

False alarms

Correct

Misses

M (SD)

M (SD)

rejections

M (SD)

M (SD)
CJs
Compound

8.95 (0.94)

7.40 (1.51)

7.35 (1.62)

5.62 (2.39)

High Strength

9.06 (0.82)

7.95 (1.23)

8.03 (1.69)

6.15 (2.39)

Low Strength

8.62 (0.92)

6.71 (1.76)

7.58 (1.55)

5.75 (2.07)

Compound

2.29 (0.67)

3.01 (1.15)

3.10 (0.76)

3.47 (2.37)

High Strength

2.43 (0.72)

3.58 (2.07)

3.44 (1.15)

2.92 (1.31)

Low Strength

2.92 (0.99)

4.53 (2.60)

3.23 (1.04)

3.45 (1.86)

Response Time

For both main effects post-hoc analyses were done on all comparisons using paired
sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. In terms of CJs by Pair Type: CJs for
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High Strength pairs were greater than Compound pairs (t(16) = -3.57, p = .008, d = 0.87), CJs for
High Strength pairs were greater than Low Strength pairs (t(15) = 4.3, p = .002, d = 1.08), and
CJs for Compound pairs did not differ from Low Strength pairs (t(16) = 0.64, p = 1, d = 0.15).
This pattern of results indicates that participants were more confident in their memory for High
Strength pairs than for either Compound or Low Strength pairs.
The analysis for Response Type5 showed that Hits were greater than False alarms (t(23) =
-7.15, p < .001, d = 1.46), Hits were greater than Correct rejections (t(31) = -6.61, p < .001, d =
1.17), Hits were greater than Misses (t(16) = 5.8, p < .001, d = 1.41), False alarms were greater
than Misses (t(13) = 3.78, p = .014, d = 1.01), Correction rejections were greater than Misses
(t(16) = 3.25, p = .03, d = 0.79), and Correct rejections and False alarms did not differ (t(23) =
0.03, p = 1, d = 0.01). This pattern of results suggest that participants’ overall CJs were in line
with their performance, since they gave greater CJs when they were correct than incorrect.
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time; there was a significant main
effect of Response type (F(3, 24) = 3.37, MSe = 0.84, p =.035, η2p = .3), no main effect of Pair
Type (F(2, 16) = 3.38, MSe = 0.33, p =.06, η2p = .3), and no significant interaction (F(2.87,
22.98) = 1.08, MSe = 1.76, p =.386, η2p = .12).
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was performed on all
comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. False
alarms were greater than Hits (t(26) = -5.43, p < .001, d = 1.05), Correct rejections were greater
than Hits (t(31) = 7.76, p < .001, d = 1.37), Misses were greater than Hits (t(14) = -3.35, p =
.028, d = 0.87), False alarms did not differ from Correct rejections (t(26) = 0.42, p = 1, d = 0.08),
False alarms did not differ from Misses (t(13) = -0.68, p = 1, d = 0.18), and Correct rejections

5

For all three experiments, when examining a Response Type factor the degrees of freedom varies because not all
participants had values for each level of the factor.
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did not differ from Misses (t(14) = -0.34, p = 1, d = 0.09). Overall participants were quickest to
respond after a Hit, while response times were equal following a Miss, a Correct rejection, and a
False alarm.
Performance x Metacognition
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study
and their corresponding performance at test6. All three pair types, Compound (M = .24, SD =.48),
High Strength (M = .20, SD = .61), and Low Strength (M = .32, SD = .39) had moderately low
correlations. This suggests participants were not very accurate at predicting their performance
when prompted immediately after study.
To examine the accuracy of CJs we once again used gamma correlations but analyzed
Intact and Rearranged pairs separately. For Intact pairs all three pair types, Compound (M = .72,
SD = .42), High Strength (M = .70, SD =.55), and Low Strength (M = .75, SD = .32) had
moderately high correlations, while for Rearranged pairs all three pairs types, Compound (M = .12, SD = .54), High Strength (M = .07, SD =.58), and Low Strength (M = .22, SD = .68) had
correlations that were low and close to zero. Overall participants were accurate at judging their
performance on Intact trials but not rearranged trials.
Discussion
We replicated the concordant Compound Word effect for both Compound word pairs and
High Strength word pairs when compared to Low Strength word pairs. As expected, d’ did not
differ among the three pair types. In terms of metacognitive measures, during study participants
gave higher JOLs and less study time to Compound and High Strength pairs compared to Low
Strength pairs indicating that they considered Compound and High Strength pairs easier to

6

Trial-by-trial JOLs collected at study ask for a judgment of future performance, therefore the accuracy of a JOL
can only be tested using trials that appear later at test, which in this case are only Intact trials.
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remember than Low Strength pairs. During test participants were most confident in their
responses to High Strength pairs compared to Compound and Low Strength pairs, while the
response times did not differ among the three pair types. However, response times did differ
based on correctness, where participants were fast to respond when they were correct (Hit) but
also incorrect (Miss) demonstrating a discrepancy in their implicit metacognitive judgments for
Intact trials.
When considering participants’ memory performance and metacognitive measures
together, JOLs were not very accurate at predicting future performance. This is consistent with
the literature on immediate JOL ratings given directly after each study trial. On the other hand,
CJs indicated that at test participants were more accurate overall at judging their memory
performance because they gave higher ratings when they were correct than when they were
incorrect. They also had faster reaction times when they were correct. However, participants
were only accurate at judging their performance on intact trials, not rearranged trials. This
discrepancy seemed to be largest for Compound word pairs which even had a negative relation
between CJs and performance on rearranged trials. The poor accuracy for CJs for rearranged
trials is likely caused by their increased familiarity resulting in increased confidence for false
alarms. This finding corresponds with the results from DeSoto and Roediger (2014) who found
that confidence ratings are similarly poorly correlated with accuracy for related lures.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1 we used compound word pairs in order to replicate the concordant
Compound Word effect; we also found that it generalized to word pairs with high preexperimental association (high strength). By including numerous metacognitive measures
throughout the procedure, we were able to account for different aspects of participants’
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metacognitive behavior as they completed an associative memory task. For Experiment 2 we
changed the stimulus manipulation in such a way as to find a different pattern for memory
performance. That is, instead of using compound word pairs and finding a concordant effect, we
used concrete and abstract word pairs and expected to find a mirror effect. Studies have shown
that concrete word pairs have higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability
than abstract word pairs (Hockley, 1994; Paivio, et al., 1994). If we were to find this pattern for
the memory performance, we would expect participants to show favourable metacognitive
ratings towards concrete word pairs compared to abstract word pairs. It was uncertain how this
change in stimulus manipulation would affect other aspects of participants’ metacognitive
behavior. Would there be a large difference between judgments for the two types of word pairs?
Would all the metacognitive measures show similar discrepancies? How would the accuracy of
participants’ judgments change? In general, our goal for Experiment 2 was to gain more insight
into how metacognitive behavior changes when associative memory performance changes.
Method
Participants
Thirty-two participants took part in Experiment 2. For this experiment, data from four
participants was excluded because they had low corrected recognition scores. This left data from
28 participants which was used for the analysis of Experiment 2.
Materials
There were 96 word pairs of two types: Concrete and Abstract. All words were taken
from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Concrete words had a minimum
concreteness value of 600 (M = 616.4, SD = 12.85), while Abstract words had a maximum
concreteness value of 350 (M = 302.2, SD = 31.41). All words were equated for familiarity,
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imageability, word frequency, word length and number of syllables. Word pairs were created by
randomly putting two words of the same type together. All other materials were identical to
Experiment 1 (see Appendix B for list of word pairs).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 2 followed that of Experiment 1, with a few notable
changes. The number of study trials was reduced to 96; three trials at the beginning and at the
end of the study phase accounted for primacy and recency effects and were not analyzed. Of the
remaining trials half were Concrete and half were Abstract, although the list was presented
randomly. For the test phase we gave participants feedback on whether they were correct or
incorrect, the feedback slide lasted for 1000 ms. Participants first gave their yes or no response to
each pair, then they were asked for a CJ, then feedback was given. Lastly, participants were told
how well they did overall at the end of the experiment.
Results
Recognition performance
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be
found in Table 4. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: Concrete vs.
Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA with proportion of old responses as the dependent
variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 27) = 237.05, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η2p =
.9) where HR was greater than FAR, no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 27) < 1), and a significant
interaction (F(1, 27) = 23.14, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η2p = .46).
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for
Experiment 2.
Concrete

Abstract

M (SD)

M (SD)

HR

.83 (.13)

.72 (.16)

FAR

.14 (.13)

.23 (.13)

d’

2.40 (1.09)

1.51 (.85)

C

.05 (.27)

.06 (.31)

To examine the interaction between Pair Types and Probe Types, we performed pairwise
comparisons using paired sample t-test with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Concrete
pairs had a greater HR than Abstract pairs (t(27) = -3.73, p < .001), while Abstract pairs had a
greater FAR than Concrete pairs (t(27) = 3.17, p = .004). This pattern demonstrated a mirror
effect (higher HR and lower FAR) that is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 2. The error bars represent
standard deviations of the means.

A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was performed to examine the difference in d’ according
to the Pair Type. There was a significant difference (χ2(1) = 8.21, p = .004)7, Concrete pairs had
greater d’ values than Abstract pairs. To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if the
criterion estimates differed from zero. Neither estimate for Concrete (t(27) = 0.89, p = .381, d =
0.17) nor Abstract pairs (t(27) = 1.09, p = .287, d = 0.21) differed from zero, meaning both had
no significant bias.
Metacognitive Measures

A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 54) = 11.16, MSe = 0.95, p = .001, η2p = .18), however the
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used because the ANOVA violated the sphericity assumption.
7
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Three participants were excluded from data analysis for all of the metacognitive measures
due to failure to follow instructions. The reasons for this varied, however some examples
include: giving the same JOL for all study trials, failing to give any JOL or CJ ratings, or giving
ratings outside of specified range.
Study
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 5.
We ran a one-way ANOVA with Pair Type (Concrete vs. Abstract) as a within-subjects factor
and mean JOL as the dependent variable. There was no significant effect of Pair Type (F(1, 48)
< 1). A Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was performed on mean Study; there was no main effect
(χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .934)8.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair
Type for Experiment 2.

JOLs
Study time

Concrete

Abstract

M (SD)

M (SD)

55.99 (16.63)

51.99 (16.04)

8.91 (4.41)

9.12 (4.74)

Test
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in
Table 6. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 2
(Pair Type: Concrete vs. Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA with mean CJ as the dependent

8

A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 46) < 1), however the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used
because the ANOVA violated the normality assumption.
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variable. There was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 10) = 17.27, MSe = 1.9, p = .002, η2p = .63)
where CJs for Concrete pairs was greater than for Abstract pairs, a main effect of Response Type
(F(3, 30) = 10.05, MSe = 1.89, p < .001, η2p = .5), and no significant interaction effect (F(2.14,
21.37) = 1.10, MSe = 0.75, p = .355, η2p = .1).
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec)
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 2.

Pair Type

Hits

False alarms

Correct

Misses

M (SD)

M (SD)

rejections

M (SD)

M (SD)
CJs
Concrete

8.87 (1.05)

6.97 (1.99)

8.33 (1.48)

6.28 (1.94)

Abstract

7.87 (1.51)

5.34 (2.01)

6.69 (1.58)

5.37 (1.72)

Concrete

2.86 (0.89)

4.42 (1.84)

3.16 (0.79)

3.92 (1.61)

Abstract

4.01 (1.32)

4.86 (2.23)

3.79 (1.13)

3.86 (1.50)

Response Time

For Response Type we ran a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons using paired sample ttests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that Hits were greater
than False alarms (t(14) = -5.34, p < .001, d = -1.38), Hits were greater than Correct rejections
(t(24) = -4.15, p = .002, d = 0.83), Hits were greater than Misses (t(13) = 5.14, p = .001, d =
1.37), Correct rejections were greater than Misses (t(13) = 4.65, p = .003, d = 1.24), False alarms
did not differ from Correct rejections (t(14) = 2.58, p = .132, d = 0.67), and False alarms did not
differ from Misses (t(10) = 1.03, p = 1, d = 0.31). This pattern of results suggest that participants’
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overall CJs were in line with their performance, since they gave greater CJs when they were
correct than incorrect.
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response; there was a main effect of Pair Type
(F(1, 10) = 11.37, MSe = 1.29, p = .007, η2p = .53) where response time was greater for Abstract
pairs than Concrete pairs, a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 30) = 3.21, MSe = 1.54, p = .037,
η2p = .24), and no significant interaction effect (F(1.49, 14.89) = 1.46, MSe = 1.08, p = .245, η2p =
.13).
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons was done
using paired sample t-test with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that
False alarms were greater than Hits (t(14) = 3.25, p = .035, d = 0.84), False alarms were greater
than Correct rejections (t(14) = -3.08, p = .048, d = 0.8), Correct rejections did not differ from
Hits (t(24) = 0.77, p = 1, d = 0.16), Misses did not differ from Hits (t(13) = -1.04, p = 1, d =
0.28), False alarms did not differ from Misses (t(10) = 2.53, p = 0.178, d = 0.76), and Correct
rejections did not differ from Misses (t(13) = -1.04, p = 1, d = 0.28). Overall participants
responded the slowest when they incorrectly thought a rearranged trial was an intact trial.
Performance x Metacognition
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study
and their corresponding performance at test. Concrete pairs (M = .074, SD = .45) had correlations
close to zero, and Abstract pairs (M = .3, SD = .57) had low correlations. This suggests
participants were not very accurate at predicting their future performance based on their study.
To examine the accuracy of CJs we once again used gamma correlations, but analyzed
Intact and Rearranged pairs separately. For Intact trials both Concrete pairs (M = .65, SD = .39)
and Abstract pairs (M = .65, SD = .35) had moderately high correlations, while for Rearranged
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trials both Concrete pairs (M = .15, SD = .6) and Abstract pairs (M = .25, SD = .53) had low
correlations. Overall participants were accurate at judging their performance on Intact trials but
not rearranged trials.
Discussion
We replicated the mirror effect typically found between Concrete and Abstract word
pairs. This resulted in significant differences in discriminability, as measured by d’, where
Concrete pairs had better discriminability than Abstract pairs. Interestingly, this difference did
not seem to affect metacognitive behavior at study as participants gave equal JOLs and study
time to Concrete and Abstract pairs. Suggesting that participants considered the two pair types
equally difficult to remember. However, during test participants gave greater CJs and were faster
to respond to Concrete than Abstract pairs indicating that they were more confident in their
memory for Concrete than Abstract pairs. In addition, participants gave greater CJs and were
faster to respond when they were correct than incorrect. Overall, participants’ metacognitive
behavior at test was in line with their performance.
Considering the correlation between participants’ memory performance and
metacognitive measures, JOLs were once again not very accurate at predicting performance.
This, in addition to the lack of differences between JOLs for concrete and abstract pairs
demonstrates the poor relation between JOLs and memory performance. The pattern for CJs was
also similar to Experiment 1, where CJs had moderately high accuracy for intact trials but low
accuracy for rearranged trials. This pattern seemed to be consistent for Concrete and Abstract
pairs, suggesting this stimulus manipulation did not affect the discrepancy in metacognitive
behavior for intact and rearranged trials.
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Experiment 3
Experiment 2 was successful in replicating the mirror effect typically found between
concrete and abstract word pairs. This was in contrast to Experiment 1 where we found a
concordant effect between word pairs with high pre-experimental association and word pairs
with low pre-experimental association. Considering the clear memory advantage of concrete
word pairs to abstract word pairs it was surprising that participants did not report higher
judgments for concrete word pairs than abstract word pairs at study, nor did they study one type
of pair longer than the other. However, participants were more confident in their responses at test
for concrete compared to abstract word pairs. For Experiment 3, we were interested in seeing
whether this discrepancy in metacognitive accuracy between study and test would remain the
same when a more salient stimulus manipulation was used. Therefore, we tested participants’
associative memory on picture pairs compared to word pairs. We expected to find a picture
superiority effect, picture pairs having higher hit rates compared to word pairs, which has been
consistently shown to occur in associative memory tasks (Hockley, 2008; Hockley & Bancroft,
2011). The only change in the expected pattern of results compared to Experiment 2 was that
there would be no difference in the false alarm rates for the two types of rearranged pairs.
However, we were interested in knowing whether the much more noticeable difference between
the pair types would have an effect on metacognitive behavior.
Method
Participants
Forty-six participants took part in Experiment 3. For this experiment, data from two
participants was excluded because they had low corrected recognition scores. This left data from
44 participants which was used for analysis of Experiment 3.
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Materials
A total of 184 pictures with their corresponding verbal labels were chosen from the Bonin
et al. (2003) norm set. Two lists were created of 90 pictures each and their corresponding labels.
Pictures were basic black and white line drawings of common objects, such as a canoe, a bus, a
peach, etc. We counterbalanced the lists such that half of the participants were tested on the
pictures of list one with the word labels of list two and the other half of the participants were
tested on pictures of list two with the word labels of list one. There were four picture-label pairs
used to account for primacy and recency effects and were not analyzed. All other materials were
identical to Experiments 1 and 2.
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 3 followed that of Experiment 2, except for the stimulus
changes and that there were only two trials at the beginning and end of the study list used to
account for primacy and recency effects. One other change, which was unintentional and due to a
programming error, was that while the word or picture pair was displayed participants could
input their JOL response at any point. This means that, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, for
Experiment 3 we could not distinguish between the time used for study and the time used to
make a JOL.
Results
Recognition performance
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be
found in Table 7. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: Words vs. Pictures)
repeated measures ANOVA with proportion of old responses as the dependent variable. There
was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 43) = 470.19, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η2p = .92) where HR
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was greater than FAR, no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 43) < 1), and a significant interaction
(F(1, 43) = 18.39, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η2p = .3).
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for
Experiment 3.
Pair Type

Pictures

Words

M (SD)

M (SD)

HR

.87 (.13)

.79 (.17)

FAR

.14 (.13)

.19 (.13)

d’

2.55 (.98)

1.98 (.96)

C

-.01 (.29)

.03 (.35)

To examine the interaction, we performed paired sample t-tests for each Pair Type by
Probe Type, with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Picture pairs had a greater HR than
Word pairs (t(43) = 3.69, p < .001, d = .56), while Word pairs had a greater FAR than Picture
pairs (t(43) = -2.36, p = .023, d = .36). This pattern demonstrated a mirror effect that is shown in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5
Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 3. The error bars represent
standard deviations of the means.

We performed a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for Pair Type (Words vs. Pictures) on d’
and found a significant effect (χ2(1) = 7.45, p = .006)9, where discrimination for Picture pairs
was greater than for Word pairs. To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if the
criterion estimates differed from zero. Neither estimate for Picture (t(43) = -0.19, p = .849, d =
.03) nor Word pairs (t(43) = 0.52, p = .607, d = .08) differed from zero, meaning both had no
significant bias.

A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 86) = 7.48, MSe = 0.94, p = .008, η2p = .08), however the
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used because the ANOVA violated the Normality assumption.
9
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Metacognitive Measures
Six participants were excluded from data analysis for all of the metacognitive measures
in Experiment 3 for not following instructions.
Study
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 8.
For the JOLs we ran a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test with Pair Type (Words vs. Pictures) as a
within-subjects factor10. There was no main effect (χ2(1) = 0.07, p = .787). We ran a one way
ANOVA on mean Study Time; there was no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 74) = 3.19, MSe =
7.42, p = .078, η2p = .04). There appears to be a trend of Pictures being studied longer than
Words, this difference may also have been attenuated by the fact that the study time measure in
Experiment 3 included the time to make a JOL response.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair
Type for Experiment 3.
Measure

JOLs
Study Time

Pictures

Words

M (SD)

M (SD)

55.20 (17.38)

53.76 (16.41)

7.15 (2.80)

6.03 (2.64)

Test
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in
Table 9. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 2

10

A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 74) < 1), however the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used
because the ANOVA violated the Normality assumption.
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(Pair Type: Words vs. Pictures) repeated measures ANOVA on the mean CJs. There was a main
effect of Response Type (F(3, 42) = 15.53, MSe = 3.58, p < .001, η2p = .53), no main effect of
Pair Type (F(1, 14) = 1.01, MSe = 1.51, p = .332, η2p = .07), and no significant interaction (F(3,
42) = 1.81, MSe = 1.57, p = .16, η2p = .11).
Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec)
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 3.
Pair Type

Hits

False alarms

Correct

Misses

M (SD)

M (SD)

rejections

M (SD)

M (SD)
CJs
Pictures

8.80 (0.94)

5.93 (2.42)

8.07 (1.57)

5.82 (2.15)

Words

8.47 (1.11)

5.80 (2.06)

7.30 (1.45)

5.21 (1.45)

Pictures

2.80 (0.91)

4.10 (1.66)

3.11 (0.96)

3.13 (1.36)

Words

2.83 (0.73)

3.97 (1.68)

3.48 (1.29)

3.74 (1.86)

Response Time

For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was done for all comparisons
using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis for
Response Type showed that Hits were greater than False alarms (t(19) = -5.36, p < .001, d = 1.2),
Hits were greater than Correct rejections (t(37) = -7.1, p < .001, d = 1.15), Hits were greater than
Misses (t(21) = 9.31, p < .001, d = 1.98), Correct rejections were greater than Misses (t(21) =
5.63, p < .001, d = 1.2), Correct rejections did not differ from False alarms (t(19) = 2.22, p =
.231, d = 0.5), and False alarms did not differ from Misses (t(14) = 1.25, p = 1, d = 0.32). This
pattern of results suggest that participants’ overall CJs were mostly in line with their
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performance, since for the majority of trials they gave greater CJs when they were correct than
incorrect.
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time. There was no significant main
effect of Response type (F(3, 30) = 2.47, MSe = 0.48, p =.081, η2p = .2), no main effect of Pair
Type (F(1, 10) < 1), and no significant interaction (F(3, 30) < 1). Because there was a trend for a
main effect of Response type, we still performed all comparisons using paired sample t-tests with
a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that Correct rejections were greater
than Hits (t(37) = -7.1, p < .001, d = .84), Hits did not differ from False alarms (t(16) = 2.72, p =
.091, d = .66) or Misses (t(18) = -1.63, p = .72, d = .37), False alarms did not differ from Correct
rejections (t(15) = -1.66, p = .708, d = .42) or Misses (t(7) = 1.32, p = 1, d = .47), and Correct
rejections did not differ from Misses (t(17) = 0.27, p = 1, d = .06). Ultimately, the analysis
showed that there were no large differences in response times at test, except that participants did
respond faster when they were correct on intact trials compared to rearranged trials.
Performance x Metacognition
To examine the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study
and their corresponding performance at test. Both Pictures (M = .35, SD = .44) and Words (M =
.35, SD = .52) had relatively low gamma correlations. Once again demonstrating that participants
had low accuracy when predicting their future performance based on their study.
To examine the accuracy of CJs, we again measured the gamma correlations but analyzed
intact and rearranged pairs separately. For intact trials both Picture (M = .76, SD = .28) and Word
pairs (M = .76, SD = .3) had high correlations, while for rearranged trials both Picture (M = .27,
SD = .7) and Word pairs (M = .18, SD = .61) had low correlations. This pattern is similar to the
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previous experiments where participants were overall accurate at judging their performance on
intact trials but not rearranged trials.
Discussion
We replicated the picture superiority effect in associative memory previously found
between picture and word pairs (Hockley, 2008). In contrast to previous demonstrations of the
picture superiority effect in associative recognition, the effect was demonstrated as a mirror
effect, where picture pairs had higher hit rates but lower false alarm rates compared to word
pairs. The reason for the difference observed in the false alarm rates is not known. However, as
in previous research, pictures had better discriminability compared to word pairs. Similar to
Experiment 2, there were no differences in metacognitive behavior at study as participants gave
similar JOLs and study time to picture and word pairs. This suggests that participants considered
picture and word pairs to be equally difficult to remember. Unlike Experiment 2, participants
showed no differences in CJs or response time at test for pictures and words, suggesting that they
considered their memory for pictures and words to be equal. This corresponds to their
metacognitive behavior at study. In terms of their performance, participants tended to give higher
CJs when they were correct than incorrect. However, the only difference in reaction time was
that they were faster to respond when they were correct on intact trials compared to rearranged
trials.
Looking at the correlation between memory performance and metacognition, JOLs were
again not very accurate and CJs again showed a discrepancy between intact and rearranged trials.
For CJs, the pattern was similar to Experiment 2, where correlations seemed to be consistent for
picture and word pairs, suggesting that this stimulus manipulation also did not affect the
interaction between metacognitive behavior and trial type (intact vs. rearranged).
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General Discussion
In terms of performance on an associative recognition test, the results of the experiments
presented in this chapter generally followed patterns that were expected based on previous
findings. In Experiment 1, we found a concordant effect when comparing compound word pairs
to low strength word pairs and when comparing high strength word pairs to low strength word
pairs. Compound and high strength word pairs had higher hit rates and false alarm rates
compared to low strength pairs, which resulted in equivalent discriminability among the three
pair types. In Experiment 2, there was a mirror effect when comparing concrete word pairs to
abstract word pairs, where concrete word pairs had higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and
better discriminability compared to abstract word pairs. These results show a clear advantage for
concrete word pairs in terms of associative recognition memory compared to abstract word pairs.
In Experiment 3, we found another mirror effect when comparing picture pairs to unrelated word
pairs, where picture pairs had higher hit rates, lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability
compared to unrelated word pairs. Aside from the false alarm rates being lower for picture pairs,
the results were expected and showed an advantage for picture pairs over unrelated word pairs
for associative recognition memory.
Considering the results of the JOLs across all three experiments, a few findings become
apparent. First, JOLs were generally poor indicators of performance on the associative
recognition tests. This is evident by the low gamma scores across all three experiments, which
suggests that stimulus manipulations did not affect the accuracy of JOLs. This in line with
previous research on JOLs for item memory (Watier & Collin, 2012) and cued recall of paired
associates (Mueller et al., 2013). Second, somewhat surprisingly, across all of the stimulus
manipulations only the strength of the pre-existing association seemed to affect overall JOL
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ratings, where compound word pairs and high strength words pairs which have an existing
association before being studied were given higher JOLs than word pairs with low associative
strength. This finding corresponds to previous research on JOLs for paired associates where
related word pairs are given higher JOLs than unrelated word pairs (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015;
Hertzog et al., 2002).
Third, contrary to previous research concreteness did not affect general JOL scores, nor
did pictures pairs compared to unrelated word pairs. This was surprising, especially considering
the advantage that both of these manipulations provided in terms of associative recognition. The
lack of differences in JOLs may indicate a belief that the stimulus manipulations would not have
an effect on the outcome of their study in terms of associative recognition. Alternatively, JOLs as
a measurement of metacognitive sensitivity may be poor at indicating the effects of stimulus
manipulations considering the fact that they were quite inaccurate at predicting performance on
the recognition test.
Interestingly, we found no differences in study time among any of the stimulus
manipulations in all three experiments. It was expected that study time would at least mirror the
JOL ratings as it has been found with previous research (Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011), however
even as an independent metacognitive measure it was expected that study time should have
increased for stimulus that is more difficult to remember (Metcalfe, 2002; Nelson & Leonesio,
1988). Therefore, it was surprising that low strength word pairs, abstract word pairs and
unrelated word pairs were not studied for longer than other pair types given that participants had
the choice to study items for as long as they wanted, and the test results showed that these pair
types were more difficult to remember. Considering both JOLs and study time together it seems
participants chose not to change their study behavior for different stimulus manipulations.
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The metacognitive measures at test demonstrated a similar neglect for stimulus
manipulations. The only difference in CJs across all the stimulus manipulations was during
Experiment 1 where CJs were higher for high strength word pairs compared to low strength word
pairs. Stimulus manipulation made no other difference in CJ ratings nor in test reaction time.
These results suggest participants treated all item pairs equally when making confident
judgments and responses at test, at least in terms of the stimulus characteristics.
Where CJs showed a discrepancy was in terms of their accuracy for intact and rearranged
pair types. CJs for intact pairs were highly accurate, whereas CJs for rearranged pair types had
low accuracy. Considering the vast difference in these types of items it is highly likely that intact
and rearranged pairs were handled differently by the participants when they were deciding
whether an item was old or new. It follows from a dual process approach to associative
recognition memory that intact pairs can be based on familiarity with a high degree of
confidence considering that recognition for either item in a pair or for the association would
result in an old response which would be correct. Whereas decisions on a rearranged pair if
based on a recall-to-reject process where recollection of one of the items in a pair would be used
to provide conflicting information which would result in either an old response if no information
was found or a new response if information was found. With the low accuracy scores for CJs
made for rearranged pairs it seems likely that confidence at test was not made as a result of a
recall-to-reject process but rather familiarity which would explain the generally high CJ ratings
but low accuracy.
The CJ correlations were generally supported by the CJ data on the different types of
response measures at test. In all three experiments, CJs were highest following a hit but the other
three response types had similar CJs and response times. These high CJs following hits
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corresponds to the high accuracy for intact pairs. The pattern of CJs and response times for the
other types of measures was not reliable across the three experiments in order to provide any
insight on the different types of associative recognition responses.
One interesting comparison is that of JOLs and CJs with criterion placement. In
Experiment 1, compound and high strength pairs had a liberal bias whereas low strength pairs
had a conservative bias. Compound and high strength pairs then had higher JOLs compared to
low strength pairs and high strength pairs had higher CJs compared to low strength pairs. These
results suggest that these two different measures capture similar behavior in how participants
treat these different pair types. The conservative bias and low JOL scores for low strength pairs
may explain why they were slightly more accurate in terms of predictability for test performance.
Less compelling evidence that these two measures demonstrate similar behavior patterns was
found in Experiments 2 and 3 where no biases were found for the different stimulus
manipulations and no differences were found in JOLs or CJs. It would be interesting to see if
criterion corresponds to metacognitive judgments under different circumstances when these
measures do vary.
The three experiments presented in this chapter set out to explore the relation between
metamemory and associative recognition memory. The set of experiments were successful in
demonstrating a different set of results in terms of associative recognition performance. The
corresponding metamemory measures showed that metamemory behavior was largely insensitive
to the stimulus manipulations even though they had effects on memory performance. In the next
chapter, we attempted to examine this relation from a different perspective. Specifically, we
looked at whether experience with the experimental paradigm had any effects, whether
corrective feedback on performance had any effects, and whether adding a delay to the JOLs
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would have any effects. Unlike the three experiments presented in this chapter, the changes in
procedure for the experiments in the next chapter were designed to explicitly have an effect on
study or response behavior. In addition, the next experiments included stimulus manipulations
that replicate the major findings of Experiment 1 and 2.
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Chapter 3: Experiments IV-VI
Experiment 4
Metacognitive monitoring can have an impact on our behavior during a memory task in a
multitude of ways. The process of monitoring our memory while we learn new information has
an active role in determining when learning needs to continue, when it can be terminated, or
when a new strategy needs to be implemented. The experiments presented in Chapter 2
demonstrated numerous ways in which we monitor associative memory, such as through selfassessments, with study time allocation, or when our biases and beliefs about our own memory
affect our learning. Our findings showed that often people failed to correctly account for
important factors that affected their associative memory performance. Although participants
identified differences in stimulus characteristics, which was evident when they were more
confident in their ability to remember word pairs that were more concrete than abstract, this did
not seem to change the way they studied the two pair types. Their general increased confidence
in easier items than more difficult items (e.g., picture pairs compared to unrelated word pairs)
also did not result in better accuracy for the individual items. Ultimately, study behavior
throughout the first three experiments could be summarized as participants incorrectly
monitoring the impact of differences in item characteristics on their future memory.
In some ways metacognitive monitoring during the associative memory test was better in
terms of the way participants accounted for various factors on their recognition memory. For
instance, they were quite accurate at being able to rate their confidence when responding on pairs
that were previously studied. However, this was in direct contrast to their accuracy in rating their
confidence for new pairs that had not been previously studied. This dichotomy in behavior for
two different kinds of test items is in line with the dual process theory of associative recognition
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memory, where old pairs can be identified with high confidence solely based on a fast
familiarity-type process, whereas new pairs require recollection of specific information about the
individual items in a pair or the associative information in order to be confidently identified. This
recollection process is slower and requires specific details about a past event. It also takes more
effort to do, which may have resulted in participants using it less and therefore lacking accurate
confidence ratings in their response to new pairs. Similar to study behavior, participants rated
higher confidence in one type of test pair over another but they did not change their response
behavior according to the type of test pair, such as taking longer to respond to a pair when they
were less confident in their response.
The goal of the next three experiments (Experiments 4, 5, and 6), which will be described
in this chapter, was to examine factors that may directly change metacognitive behavior. The
three experiments had a similar general procedure, where participants studied a list of pairs of
items and then were tested on the list with a yes or no associative recognition memory test. All of
the experiments included the following metacognitive measures: judgments of learning (JOLs)
which were collected during study, study time allocation, confidence judgments (CJs) which
were collected at test, and response latencies. First, we examined the role of experience on both
metacognitive behavior or beliefs and associative recognition memory. Experiment 4 had
participants study a list of compound word (CW) pairs and non-compound word (NCW) pairs,
which was done to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and those of Ahmad and Hockley
(2014). JOLs were item-by-item JOLs where they were collected after each word pair had been
studied. Confidence judgments were similarly collected after each response on the test had been
given. Reaction time during the whole procedure was recorded, allowing for study time to be
measured as well as response latencies. The unique aspect of Experiment 4 was the addition of a
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second study-test block. This second study-test block was performed on a different list of
compound and non-compound word pairs. One potential effect of having performed one studytest block is that participants would gain an understanding of how the stimulus manipulation
differentially affects their associative recognition memory at test. In that case, we would expect
that their JOLs for compound word pairs in the second block would decrease when compared to
the first block. This would indicate that participants updated their metacognitive beliefs of how
compound word pairs would be remembered based on their experience with them in an
associative recognition memory task. It is also possible that experience with the associative
memory task would have other effects on their behavior in the second block, such as changes in
study time allocation between the different stimuli, different response latencies, and possibly
improved performance on discriminability for CW pairs.
Second, we examined the role of feedback and how knowing when a response was
correct or incorrect might affect future behavior. Experiment 5 was quite similar to Experiment 4
including the same stimulus list and the inclusion of a second study-test block. The unique
addition to Experiment 5 was that both after making a response on a test item and giving a CJ
rating, participants were given feedback on whether their response was correct or incorrect.
Because we were only interested in how feedback affected behavior during the second block, it
was only given during the first test phase in Block 1. Feedback is an important diagnostic tool for
learning new information as it allows us to correct our perceptions of when information is
learned versus when it is not. Feedback on a memory task is not as beneficial as for example on a
learning task, however it has been shown to improve metacognitive rating accuracy (Carpenter et
al., 2019; Sharp et al., 1988), although not always (e.g., Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). We expected
that the added benefits of experience with the associative memory task and the effects of
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feedback may improve metacognitive monitoring and control and possibly improve
discriminability for more difficult items.
Third, we examined one of the well-known methods of improving JOL rating accuracy,
which is to delay the time after an item is studied and when a JOL rating is given. In Experiment
6, the procedure was similar to the previous two experiments except that there was only one
study-test block and the stimuli changed from compound and non-compound word pairs to
concrete and abstract word pairs. This allowed for a replication of the results of Experiment 2,
previously reported in Chapter 2. The unique aspect of Experiment 6 was that instead of
collecting immediate trial-by-trial JOLs, we asked participants to give delayed-JOLs. DelayedJOLs were collected after the entire study list had finished being studied, where participants were
presented with the study list again and made a JOL for each word pair. While immediate JOLs
have been demonstrated to be poorly correlated to test performance, delayed-JOLs have been
shown to significantly improve the accuracy of JOLs (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). The marked
improvement in accuracy for delayed-JOLs has been demonstrated to be a result of differences in
metacognitive ratings rather than improvements in actual memory performance. (Tauber et al.,
2015). We expected that delayed-JOLs would be more accurate than immediate JOLs, regardless
of the type of word pair.
Overall, the purpose of Experiments 4, 5, and 6 was to examine whether significant
procedural changes would impact metacognitive behavior. Whereas in the first three experiments
reported in Chapter 2 which simply changed the stimulus manipulations, the three experiments in
this chapter were designed with the intention of having positive effects on participants’ study
behavior which may improve their performance on more difficult items. Experiment 4 will be
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examined first, as the initial experiment that looked at how experience with an associative
recognition memory task might affect metacognitive behavior or memory performance.
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven participants took part in Experiment 4. For the three experiments presented
in this chapter all participants were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Wilfrid
Laurier University. No basic demographic information (age and gender) was collected from the
participants; however, we are not aware of any effects of age or gender differences in young
adults that affect recognition memory. We used corrected recognition scores (hit rate – false
alarm rate) to determine exclusion from further analysis, this resulted in data from four
participants being excluded from the analysis of Experiment 4 due to low corrected recognition
scores (<= 0.15). The remaining data from 23 participants was used for analysis of Experiment 4.
Regardless of inclusion in the data analysis, all participants received course credit in exchange
for their participation.
Materials
The experiment was conducted on an IBM-compatible PC computer with a 17-in. LCD
monitor housed in an individual cubicle and using SuperLab 5.0 software (Cedrus, San Pedro,
CA). There were a total of 192 word pairs, presented in Gills Sans MT, style-Regular, colorblack, size 28 font on a white background, with 10 spaces in between the two words. All of the
compound word pairs were the same as those used by Ahmad and Hockley (2014). The noncompound words were obtained from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981) and
matched the compound words in terms of concreteness (M = 541.48, SD = 83.06), familiarity (M
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= 549.07, SD = 49.9), word frequency (M = 102.13, SD = 180.38), and number of letters (M =
4.29, SD = 0.89) (see Appendix B for list of word pairs).
Procedure
The experiment was completed by each participant individually in a small cubicle. The
experiment began with a set of instructions for the first study phase. The entire experiment was
self-paced, where participants pressed the spacebar key to progress. The first study phase was
composed of 96 trials, with each trial containing a word pair and a JOL rating. Word pairs were
presented in the middle of the screen and lasted until the participant pressed the spacebar to
indicate that they were done studying that particular pair. Study time was measures as the time
taken between a word pair being presented on the screen and the spacebar being pressed in
milliseconds (ms). Once participants finished studying a word pair they gave a corresponding
JOL rating between 1 and 100, where 1 indicated that “You do not think you will remember the
word pair at all”, and 100 indicated that “You will definitely remember the word pair”.
Participants were encouraged to make use of the entire range of the scale. A display box showed
their response and allowed them to make any corrections. Three trials at the beginning and three
trials at the end of the study list were used to reduce primacy and recency effects and were not
analyzed. Of the remaining 90 trials, half had compound word pairs and half had non-compound
words pairs, but they were presented in a completely random order for each participant.
Participants could take a short break after completing the study phase and before starting the test
phase.
The first test phase was composed of 60 trials. Each trial was self-paced and contained a
word pair and a CJ rating. For the test, the task for participants was to indicate whether a word
pair had been presented during the study phase, responding with the “s” key to indicated yes or
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the “n” key to indicate no. Half the test list had compound word pairs and half had noncompound word pairs. Additionally, half of the test list were intact trials (appeared the same as
on the study list) and half were rearranged trials. Rearranged pairs were made by using two study
list pairs, the left-side word of one pair was used with the right-side word of another pair; leftright side location and pair type remained the same (i.e., a new Compound word pair was made
from two previous Compound pairs). After making a response, they were immediately prompted
for a CJ rating between 1 and 10, where 1 indicated that “You have no idea whether your
response is correct or not”, and 10 indicated that “You are absolutely certain that your response
is correct”. The test list was presented in a completely random order which was different for each
participant. Response latencies were measured by recording the interval between a test pair first
appearing on screen and when a response key was pressed.
The first test phase was complete when participants finished responding to the entire test
list. They were then allowed to take a short break if they wanted to before starting the second
block. The procedure for the second block was identical to the first block. Block 2 also had
different study and test lists.
Results
Recognition performance
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be
found in Table 10. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2
(Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)11 with proportion of old
responses as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 22) = 247.25,
MSe = 0.06, p < .001, η2p = .92), with HR being greater than FAR, a main effect of Pair Type

11

For all three experiments, if a repeated measures ANOVA was used then the assumption of sphericity was tested
using Mauchly’s Test for sphericity and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was made if that assumption was violated.
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(F(1, 22) = 19.51, MSe = 0.02, p < .001, η2p = .47), with CW being greater than NCW, no main
effect of Block (F(1, 22) < 1), no Pair Type x Probe Type interaction (F(1, 22) = 1.04, MSe =
0.02, p = .32, η2p = .05), no Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 22) = 3.16, MSe = 0.01, p = .09,
η2p = .13), no Probe Type x Block interaction (F(1, 22) < 1), and no Pair Type x Probe Type x
Block interaction (F(1, 22) = 3.43, MSe = 0.01, p = .08, η2p = .14).
Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for
Experiment 4.
Block 1
Pair Type

Block 2

CW

NCW

CW

NCW

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

HR

.88 (.11)

.76 (.15)

.87 (.12)

.74 (.17)

FAR

.33 (.22)

.20 (.16)

.27 (.20)

.24 (.16)

d’

1.85 (.78)

1.77 (.77)

2.03 (.83)

1.59 (.89)

C

-.43 (.43)

.08 (42)

-.28 (.47)

.02 (.39)

This pattern of means is consistent with a concordant effect (higher HR and higher FAR)
when comparing CW pairs to NCW pairs in both Blocks (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6
Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type and Block in Experiment 4. The error bars
represent standard deviations of the means.

A 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA was
performed on d’. There was no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 22) = 2.48, MSe = 0.64, p = .13,
η2p = .1), no main effect of Block (F(1, 22) < 1), and no significant interaction (F(1, 22) = 3.01,
MSe = 0.26, p = .1, η2p = .12). This is in line with the concordant effect mentioned previously, as
the decrease in both HR and FAR for NCW pairs compared CW pairs resulted in equal d’ values.
To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if they differed from zero and found that
CW pairs had a significant liberal bias (Block 1: t(22) = -4.8, p < .001, d = 1; Block 2: t(22) = 2.86, p = .009, d = 0.6), while NCW pairs had no bias (Block 1: t(22) = 0.93, p = .36, d = 0.19;
Block 2: t(22) = 0.26, p = 8, d = 0.05).
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Metacognitive Measures
One participant’s data were omitted from analyses of all of the metacognitive measures
for failing to follow instructions. Specifically, the participant gave the same CJ for the majority
of test trials.
Study
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 11.
We ran a 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA on mean
JOL and found a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 21) = 85.69, MSe = 234.69, p < .001, η2p = .8),
where CW was greater than NCW, no main effect of Block (F(1, 21) = 2.54, MSe = 64.97, p =
.126, η2p = .11), and no significant interaction (F(1, 21) = 2.83, MSe = 24.88, p = .108, η2p = .12).
The same ANOVA was run on mean Study Time12; there was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1,
20) = 21.44, MSe = 5.68, p < .001, η2p = .52), a main effect of Block (F(1, 20) = 17.1, MSe =
5.91, p < .001, η2p = .46), and a significant interaction (F(1, 20) = 10.92, MSe = 1.89, p = .004,
η2p = .35).
To examine the interaction we ran all comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a
Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Study time for CW pairs remained the same from Block 1
to Block 2 (t(21) = 2.84, p = .059, d = 0.6), whereas study time decreased for NCW pairs from
Block 1 to Block 2 (t(20) = 3.48, p = .014, d = .76).

Extreme outliers were identified – and removed – using boxplot methods as values above Q3 + (1.5xIQR) or
below Q1 – (1.5xIQR), where Q1 and Q3 are the first and third quartiles, respectively, and IQR is the interquartile
range. For all reaction time analyses in all 3 experiments outliers were identified with this criteria and subsequently
removed.
12
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec.) by Pair
Type for Experiment 4.
Block 1
Measure

JOLs
Study Time

Block 2

CW

NCW

CW

NCW

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

71.51 (17.66)

39.48 (18.90)

72.46 (14.89)

44.01 (20.18)

4.08 (2.76)

7.03 (4.20)

2.36 (1.48)

3.72 (2.98)

Test
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in
Table 12. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct rejections vs. Misses) x 2
(Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA with mean CJ as the
dependent variable. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(1.82, 9.08) = 10.17, MSe =
6.48, p = .005, η2p = .67), no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 5) = 2.75, MSe = 4.7, p = .158, η2p =
.36), no main effect of Block (F(1, 5) < 1), a Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 5) = 9.32, MSe =
0.13, p = .028, η2p = .65), a Pair Type x Response Type interaction (F(3, 15) = 3.49, MSe = 2.4, p
= .042, η2p = .41), no Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 15) < 1), and no Pair Type x
Block x Response Type interaction (F(1.14, 5.68) < 1).
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Table 12
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec.)
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 4.
Pair Type

Hits

False Alarms

Correct

Misses

M (SD)

M (SD)

Rejections

M (SD)

M (SD)
Block 1
CJs
CW

9.13 (0.73)

7.07 (2.30)

7.18 (1.41)

5.74 (2.27)

NCW

8.14 (1.26)

5.97 (1.98)

7.29 (1.47)

5.19 (2.18)

CW

2.59 (1.11)

3.81 (2.21)

3.69 (1.28)

3.17 (1.29)

NCW

3.11 (1.38)

4.55 (2.36)

3.69 (1.19)

3.26 (1.73)

Response Time

Block 2
CJs
CW

8.80 (1.16)

7.14 (2.38)

6.94 (1.79)

6.03 (2.50)

NCW

7.87 (1.69)

5.71 (2.45)

6.92 (1.92)

5.37 (2.07)

CW

1.92 (0.91)

2.83 (1.34)

3.15 (1.56)

2.51 (1.30)

NCW

2.58 (0.90)

3.51 (1.62)

2.95 (1.65)

3.30 (1.79)

Response Time

For the Pair Type x Block interaction we collapsed across Response Type then ran two
one-way ANOVAs for each Block with Pair Type (CW vs. NCW) as a within-subjects factor.
There was a significant effect of Pair Type at Block 1 (F(1, 42) = 4.51, MSe = 1.55, p = .04, η2p =
.1) where CJs for CW pairs was greater than CJs for NCW pairs, and no effect of Pair Type at
Block 2 (F(1, 42) = 2.58, MSe = 2.66, p = .119, η2p = .06).
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For the Pair Type x Response Type interaction we collapsed across Block then for each
separate Pair Type we analyzed all comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni
adjustment to the p values. For CW Hits were greater than False Alarms ((t(21) = -4.8, p < .001,
d = 1.02), Hits were greater than Correct Rejections (t(21) = -7.83, p < .001, d = 1.67), Hits were
greater than Misses (t(16) = 5.99, p < .001, d = 1.45), False Alarms did not differ from Correct
Rejections (t(21) = -0.19, p = 1, d = 0.04), False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(16) = 2.01,
p = .37, d = 0.49), and Correct Rejections did not differ from Misses (t(16) = 2.06, p = .334, d =
0.5). These results indicate that for CW pair types participants’ confidence only increased for
intact pairs when they were correct.
For NCW Hits were greater than False Alarms (t(19) = -7.78, p < .001, d = 1.74), Hits
were greater than Correct Rejections (t(21) = -3.8, p = .006, d = 0.81), Hits were greater than
Misses (t(20) = 7.27, p < .001, d = 1.59), Correct Rejections were greater than False Alarms
(t(19) = 3.31, p = .004, d = 0.74), Correct Rejections were greater than Misses (t(20) = 4.54, p =
.001, d = 0.99), and False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(18) = 1.29, p = 1, d = 0.3).
Participants’ confidence for NCW pair types increased for both intact and rearranged pairs when
they were correct.
The same repeated measures ANOVA that was used for CJs was run on mean Test
Response Time. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 9) = 4.21, MSe = 0.64, p = .041,
η2p = .58), no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 3) = 3.24, MSe = 2.69, p = .17, η2p = .52), no main
effect of Block (F(1, 3) = 9.4, MSe = 0.98, p = .055, η2p = .76), no Pair Type x Block interaction
(F(1, 3) = 3.75, MSe = 0.08, p = .148, η2p = .56), no Pair Type x Response Type interaction (F(3,
9) = 1.33, MSe = 1.15, p = .323, η2p = .31), no Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 9) < 1),
and no Pair Type x Block x Response Type interaction (F(1.01, 3.03) < 1).
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For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was performed on all
comparisons using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. False
alarms were greater than Hits (t(29) = 3.63, p = .006, d = 0.66), Correct Rejections were greater
than Hits (t(43) = 5.45, p < .001, d = 0.82), False Alarms did not differ from Correct Rejections
(t(29) = -0.56, p = 1, d = 0.1), False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(14) = 0.75, p = 1, d =
0.19), Correct Rejections did not differ from Misses (t(22) = 0.74, p = 1, d = 0.15), and Misses
did not differ from Hits (t(22) = -2, p = .351, d = 0.42). Overall, participants were generally
quickest to respond after a Hit, while response times were equal following a Miss, a Correct
Rejection, and a False Alarm.
Performance x Metacognition
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study
and their corresponding performance at test for both Blocks for each pair type13. For Block 1
both CW (M = .14, SD = .49) and NCW (M = .3, SD = .38) pairs had low gamma correlations.
Interestingly, for Block 2 CW pairs (M = .38, SD = .67) stayed low while NCW pairs (M = .11,
SD = .58) had no correlation. This suggests participants were not very accurate at predicting their
performance when prompted immediately after study.
To examine the accuracy of CJs, we once again used gamma correlations but analyzed
Intact and Rearranged pairs separately as well as Block 1 and 2 separately. For Block 1 Intact
pairs, both CW (M = .78, SD = .25) and NCW (M = .65, SD = .38) had moderate to high
correlations, while Rearranged pairs for NCW (M = .45, SD = .45) had low correlations and CW
(M = .03, SD = .52) had no correlation. The same pattern emerged for Block 2. Intact pairs for
CW (M = .65, SD = .55) and NCW (M = .59, SD = .44) had moderate correlations, Rearranged

13

Trial-by-trial JOLs collected at study ask for a judgment of future performance, therefore the accuracy of a JOL
can only be tested using trials that appear later at test, which in this case are only intact trials.
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pairs for NCW (M = .43, SD = .44) had low correlations, and CW (M = -.07, SD = .44) had no
correlation. Overall participants were accurate at judging their performance on intact trials but
not rearranged trials and an additional second study-test block had no effect.
Discussion
We found a concordant Compound Word effect for compound word pairs compared to
non-compound words pairs. This directly replicated the recognition results of Experiment 1 in
Chapter 2 and the effect found by Ahmad and Hockley (2014), while also finding that d’ did not
differ between the two word pairs types. This pattern of results remained consistent from Block 1
to Block 2. In terms of metacognitive measures, during the first study block participants gave
higher JOLs to compound word pairs and studied them for less amount of time compared to noncompound word pairs. For the second study block participants continued to give compound word
pairs higher JOLs, but they studied them for the same amount of time as non-compound word
pairs. During test, participants were more confident in their responses for compound word pairs
than non-compound word pairs in Block 1 and Block 2. Only in Block 2 did participants also
respond to compound word pairs faster than non-compound word pairs. In terms of correctness,
hits generally had higher CJs and were responded to faster than other types of trials.
When considering participants’ memory performance and metacognitive measures
together, JOLs were not very accurate at predicting future performance. This remained true even
with an addition of a second study-test block. Therefore practice with this associative recognition
memory task did not help to increase accuracy of immediate JOLs, in fact accuracy got worse for
non-compound word pairs. The accuracy of CJs demonstrated a discrepancy between intact and
rearranged trials, where intact trials had moderate to high accuracy and rearranged trials had low
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to zero accuracy. An addition of a second study-test block also had no effect on this pattern of
results.
Experiment 5
In Experiment 4 we found that when participants were given experience with the memory
task, by having an additional study-test block, they demonstrated no meaningful differences in
any of the behavioral measures that we used. We expected that after taking the associative
recognition test participants may have become aware of the difficulty of discriminating between
intact and rearranged compound word pairs and decide to change their study behavior. What we
found from our measures of study time allocation and JOL ratings, is that participants remained
consistent with their belief that compound word pairs would be easier to remember than noncompound word pairs. One of the reasons why experience with the memory task did not affect
any of the behavioral measures in Block 2 may have been because participants were not able to
accurately monitor their performance on the first test phase. Participants were not told if the
response they gave on a test trial was correct or incorrect, therefore they may not have been
aware that compound word pairs had high hits but also high false alarms. In Experiment 5, we
decided to give participants feedback during the first test phase after they gave a response and
after they already gave a CJ rating. This ensured that their CJ ratings would not be influenced by
the information that they were correct or incorrect, but rather was only based on their ability to
monitor their recognition memory.
Method
Participants
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Thirty participants took part in Experiment 5. Data from five participants was excluded
because of their low corrected recognition scores. The remaining data from 25 participants was
used for the analysis of Experiment 5.
Materials
The materials were identical to those of Experiment 4 (see Appendix B for list of word
pairs).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 5 was the same as Experiment 4, with the exception that
during Block 1 participants were given feedback on whether their responses were correct or
incorrect. A feedback slide with “correct” in green font appeared only after they gave their CJ
rating and if they gave the correct response. Similarly, a feedback slide with “incorrect” in red
font appeared only after their CJ rating and if they gave an incorrect response. The feedback
slide remained on screen until they pressed the spacebar key to move on. Feedback was not
given in the test phase of Block 2.
Results
Recognition performance
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be
found in Table 13. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2
(Block: 1 vs. 2) Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with proportion of old
responses as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 24) = 29.7, MSe
= 0.01, p < .001, η2p = .55) where CW pairs were greater than NCW pairs, a main effect of Probe
Type (F(1, 24) = 736.92, MSe = 0.02, p < .001, η2p = .97) where HR was greater than FAR, no
main effect of Block (F(1, 24) < 1), no Pair Type x Probe Type interaction (F(1, 24) = 1.13, MSe

73
= 0.01, p = .298, η2p = .05), no Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 24) = 1.13, MSe = .01, p =
.249, η2p = .06), no Probe Type x Block interaction (F(1, 24) = 2.8, MSe = .01, p = .107, η2p = .1),
and no Pair Type x Probe Type x Block interaction (F(1, 24) < 1).
Table 13
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for
Experiment 5.
Block 1
Pair Type

Block 2

CW

NCW

CW

NCW

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

HR

.87 (.08)

.78 (.13)

.85 (.12)

.72 (.15)

FAR

.26 (.12)

.20 (.13)

.28 (.14)

.19 (.12)

d’

1.93 (.52)

1.85 (.71)

1.81 (.60)

1.62 (.70)

C

-.26 (.36)

.05 (.40)

-.25 (.39)

.15 (.35)

We performed a 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures
ANOVA on d’ and found no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 24) = 1.1, MSe = .4, p = .305, η2p =
.04), no main effect of Block (F(1, 24) = 3.06, MSe = .26, p = .093, η2p = .11), and no significant
interaction (F(1, 24) < 1). This is consistent with a concordant effect (higher HR and higher
FAR) for CW compared to NCW pairs which resulted in equivalent discriminability (see Figure
7). To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if they criterion estimates differed from
zero. CW pairs in both Block 1 (t(24) = -3.58, p = .002, d = 0.72) and Block 2 (t(24) = -3.23, p =
.004, d = 0.65) had liberal bias. NCW pairs at Block 1 (t(24) = 0.65, p = .52, d = 0.13) had no
bias, but at Block 2 (t(24) = 2.09, p = .047, d = .42) had a conservative bias.
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Figure 7
Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type and Block in Experiment 5. The error bars
represent standard deviations of the means.

Metacognitive Measures
Study
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 14.
We ran a 2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA with
mean JOL as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 24) = 189.76,
MSe = 103.78, p < .001, η2p = .89) where JOLs were higher for CW pairs than NCW pairs, no
main effect of Block (F(1, 24) = 3.52, MSe = 87.19, p = .073, η2p = .13), and no significant
interaction (F(1, 24) < 1). The same ANOVA was run on mean Study Time; there was a main
effect of Pair Type (F(1, 21) = 31.47, MSe = 1.87, p < .001, η2p = .6), a main effect of Block (F(1,
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21) = 36.68, MSe = 6, p < .001, η2p = .64), and a significant interaction (F(1, 21) = 7.49, MSe =
0.74, p = .001, η2p = .26).
Table 14
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair
Type for Experiment 5.
Block 1
Measure

JOLs
Study Time

Block 2

CW

NCW

CW

NCW

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

64.24 (18.48)

36.90 (16.91)

68.46 (13.49)

39.68 (19.98)

5.66 (3.71)

6.74 (3.60)

2.01 (0.71)

3.04 (1.43)

To examine the interaction, two separate One-way ANOVAs were performed for each
Block, with Pair Type (CW vs. NCW) as a within-subjects factor. There was no main effect at
Block 1 (F(1, 45) = 1.02, MSe = 13.4, p = .318, η2p = .02), but there was a main effect at Block 2
(F(1, 48) = 10.56, MSe = 1.28, p = .002, η2p = .18), where Study Time was greater for NCW than
CW.
Test
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in
Table 15. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct Rejections vs. Misses) x
2 (Pair Type: CW vs. NCW) x 2 (Block: 1 vs. 2) repeated measures ANOVA with mean CJ as
the dependent variable. There was a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 21) = 30.46, MSe = 1.83,
p < .001, η2p = .81), a main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 7) = 7.13, MSe = 1.46, p = .032, η2p = .51)
where CJs were higher for CW than NCW pairs, no main effect of Block (F(1, 7) < 1), no Pair
Type x Block interaction (F(1, 7) = 2.41, MSe = 0.71, p = .165, η2p = .26), no Pair Type x
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Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) = 2.56, MSe = 0.76, p = .082, η2p = .27), no Block x
Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) = 1.12, MSe = 1.52, p = .365, η2p = .14), and no Pair Type x
Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) = 1.40, MSe = .58, p = .27, η2p = .17).
Table 15
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (mean CJs and Response Time in sec)
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 5.
Pair Type

Hits

False Alarms

Correct

Misses

M (SD)

M (SD)

Rejections

M (SD)

M (SD)
Block 1
CJs
CW

8.90 (.92)

6.23 (2.12)

6.50 (1.54)

5.04 (2.14)

NCW

7.89 (1.35)

5.70 (2.68)

6.28 (1.79)

4.87 (1.94)

CW

2.46 (.54)

3.36 (1.29)

2.98 (.86)

2.76 (1.07)

NCW

3.23 (.85)

4.13 (1.46)

3.34 (.99)

3.61 (.97)

Response Time

Block 2
CJs
CW

8.77 (.83)

6.38 (1.77)

6.11 (1.44)

5.56 (2.14)

NCW

7.65 (1.32)

4.93 (2.06)

6.24 (1.64)

4.43 (1.64)

CW

1.90 (.45)

2.91 (1.30)

2.68 (.90)

2.38 (1.15)

NCW

2.48 (.54)

3.01 (0.92)

2.69 (.73)

2.86 (1.03)

Response Time

For the main effect of Response Type we ran a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons
using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed
that Hits were greater than False Alarms (t(37) = -9.92, p < .001, d = 1.61), Hits were greater
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than Correct Rejections (t(49) = -13.92, p < .001, d = 1.97), Hits were greater than Misses (t(34)
= 13.44, p < .001, d = 2.27), False alarms were greater than Misses (t(24) = 4.02, p = .003, d =
0.8), Correct rejections were greater than Misses (t(34) = 5, p < .001, d = 0.85), and False Alarms
did not differ from Correct Rejections (t(37) = 1.93, p = .364, d = 0.31). This pattern of results
suggest that participants’ overall CJs were in line with their performance, since they gave greater
CJs when they were correct than incorrect.
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time; there was a main effect of
Response Type (F(3, 21) = 8.67, MSe = 0.63, p < .001, η2p = .55), no main effect of Pair Type
(F(1, 7) = 3.52, MSe = 1.32, p = .103, η2p = .34), no main effect of Block (F(1, 7) = 5.57, MSe =
1.3, p = .05, η2p = .44), no Pair Type x Block interaction (F(1, 7) = 2.52, MSe = 0.83, p = .156,
η2p = .27), no Pair Type x Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) < 1), no Block x Response Type
interaction (F(3, 21) < 1), and no Pair Type x Block x Response Type interaction (F(3, 21) < 1).
For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis on all comparisons was done
using paired sample t-test with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed that
False Alarms were greater than Hits (t(36) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 0.83), Correct Rejections were
greater than Hits (t(48) = 3.49, p = .006, d = .5), False Alarms were greater than Correct
rejections (t(36) = -3.48, p = .008, d = 0.57), Misses did not differ from Hits (t(32) = -1.3, p = 1,
d = 0.23), False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(23) = 1.15, p = 1, d = .24), and Correct
Rejections did not differ from Misses (t(32) = -0.08, p = 1, d = 0.01). Overall participants
generally responded the fastest when they correctly responded to a word pair that had previously
been studied.
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Performance x Metacognition
To look at the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations using JOLs given at study
and their corresponding performance at test, independently for Block 1 and 2. In Block 1, JOLs
for CW (M = -.04, SD = .67) had no correlation with test performance and JOLs for NCW (M =
.19, SD = .51) had a low correlation with test performance. In Block 2, the accuracy of JOLs for
both CW (M = .33, SD = .61) and NCW (M = .23, SD = 37) increased but remained low.
To examine the accuracy of CJs, we once again used gamma correlations but analyzed
Intact and Rearranged pairs and Block 1 and 2 separately. For Block 1 Intact pairs, both CW (M
= .84, SD = .27) and NCW (M = .48, SD = .53) had moderate to high correlations, while for
Rearranged trials CW pairs (M = .1, SD = .47) had no correlation with test performance and
NCW (M = .28, SD = .61) had low correlations. The pattern remained consistent for Block 2:
Intact CW (M = .76, SD = .45) and NCW (M = .68, SD = .32) pairs had moderate to high
correlations, and Rearranged CW (M = .08, SD = .5) had no correlation with test performance
and NCW (M = .37, SD = .5) had low correlations.
Discussion
We replicated the concordant effect that we found in Experiment 4, where CW pairs had
higher hit rates but also higher false alarm rates compared to NCW pairs. This resulted in
discriminability between the two pair types being equal. An additional study-test block, where
they were given feedback during the first test phase, did have some effects. For NCW pairs,
participants went from no bias in the criterion estimates to a more conservative bias. There was
also a bigger difference in study time in Block 2, where NCW pairs were studied longer than CW
pairs. JOLs for CW pairs increased in absolute accuracy from Block 1, where they were zero, to
a low correlation in Block 2. CJs once again differed for intact pairs, where they had relatively
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high accuracy for both pairs types, and rearranged pairs, where accuracy was low or close to zero
for both pair types. The additional study-test block had no effect on CJs.
Ultimately, adding a second block and providing feedback for responses in Block 1 did
not have the expected effect on CW pairs. The measures taken at study suggest that participants
treated CW pairs the same in Block 2 as they did in Block 1, and their belief that CW pairs
would be easier to remember remained the same.
Experiment 6
The previous two experiments were designed to give participants an opportunity to learn
from their experience. Neither feedback nor an additional study-test block were found to improve
performance or metacognitive behavior for CW pairs. In Experiment 6, we included delayedJOLs, which is a metacognitive measure that is well known to improve the absolute accuracy of
JOL ratings. We expected that delayed-JOLs would be accurately correlated to test performance,
regardless of pair type. The stimuli were also changed from compound and non-compound word
pairs to concrete and abstract word pairs. This allowed for a replication of the results of
Experiment 2, previously reported in Chapter 2.
Method
Participants
Twenty-six participants took part in Experiment 6. The data from all of the participants
was used in the analysis of Experiment 6.
Materials
There were 96 word pairs of two types: Concrete and Abstract. All words were obtained
from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). Concrete words had a minimum
concreteness value of 600 (M = 616.4, SD = 12.85), while Abstract words had a maximum
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concreteness value of 350 (M = 302.2, SD = 31.41). All words were equated for familiarity,
imageability, word frequency, word length and number of syllables. Pairs were created by
randomly putting two words of the same type together. All other materials were identical to those
of Experiments 4 and 5 (see Appendix B for list of word pairs).
Procedure
The procedure for Experiment 6 was similar to that of Experiments 4 and 5 with a few
notable differences. First, there was only one study-test block. Second, the stimuli were
composed of Concrete and Abstract word pairs. Similar to Experiment 5, participants were given
feedback on whether their responses were correct or incorrect and they were told at the end of
the test phase the total number of correct responses they made on the test. Lastly and most
importantly, the JOLs were prompted after the entire study list had been completely studied
rather than a JOL prompt after each pair was studied. After the study list was completely
presented, participants were told that the study list would be presented again and that they would
be asked to give a JOL rating for each pair one at a time. The word pairs were then presented
again in the same format as the study list, but in a different random order. The JOL prompt was
the same as Experiments 4 and 5, where a box appeared near the bottom of the screen and the
participant could enter in their CJ and make any corrections. The study phase was complete after
a JOL was given for every word pair.
Results
Recognition performance
The descriptive statistics for hit rates (HR), false alarm rates (FAR), d’, and C can be
found in Table 16. We first ran a 2 (Probe Type: HR vs. FAR) x 2 (Pair Type: Concrete vs.
Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA with proportion of old responses as the dependent
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variable. There was a main effect of Probe Type (F(1, 25) = 222.75, MSe = 0.04, p < .001, η2p =
.9) where HR was greater than FAR, no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 25) < 1), and a significant
interaction (F(1, 25) = 28.96, MSe = 0.01, p < .001, η2p = .54).
Table 16
Descriptive Statistics for Associative Recognition Performance Measures by Pair Type for
Experiment 6.
Concrete

Abstract

M (SD)

M (SD)

HR

.81 (.13)

.71 (.12)

FAR

.15 (.13)

.25 (.14)

d’

2.22 (1.05)

1.35 (.74)

C

.08 (.24)

.07 (.30)

To examine the interaction, we performed paired sample t-tests for each Pair Type by
Probe Type, with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. Concrete pairs had a greater HR than
Abstract pairs (t(25) = -3.95, p < .001, d = 0.78), and Abstract pairs had a greater FAR than
Concrete pairs (t(25) = 3.4, p = .002, d = 0.67). This pattern demonstrated a mirror effect that is
shown in Figure 8.

82
Figure 8
Mean Hits and False Alarms for Each Pair Type in Experiment 6. The error bars represent
standard deviations of the means.

We performed a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for Pair Type (Concrete vs. Abstract) on d’
and found a significant effect (χ2(1) = 9.48, p = .002)14, where discrimination for Concrete pairs
was greater than for Abstract pairs. To examine C we performed one sample t-tests to see if the
criterion estimates differed from zero. Neither estimate for Concrete (t(25) = 1.66, p = .11, d =
0.33) nor Abstract pairs (t(25) = 1.24, p = .23, d = 0.24) differed from zero, meaning both had no
significant bias.

A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 50) = 12.03, MSe = 0.83, p = .001, η2p = .19), however the
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used because the ANOVA violated the Homogeneity of variance assumption.
14
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Metacognitive Measures
Study
The means and standard deviations for JOLs and Study Time can be found in Table 17.
For the JOLs we ran a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test with Pair Type (Concrete vs. Abstract) as a
within-subjects factor15. There was no main effect (χ2(1) = 1.91, p = .167). We ran a one-way
ANOVA on mean Study Time; there was no main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 44) < 1).
Table 17
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures (Mean JOLs and Study Time in sec) by Pair
Type for Experiment 6.

JOLs
Study time

Concrete

Abstract

M (SD)

M (SD)

53.69 (23.32)

45.29 (22.64)

2.80 (0.99)

3.04 (1.28)

Test
The means and standard deviations for CJs and Test Response Time can be found in
Table 18. We ran a 4 (Response Type: Hits vs. False alarms vs. Correct Rejections vs. Misses) x
2 (Pair Type: Concrete vs. Abstract) repeated measures ANOVA on the mean CJs. There was a
main effect of Pair Type (F(1, 14) = 12.06, MSe = 2.35, p = .004, η2p = .46) where Concrete pairs
were given higher CJs than Abstract pairs, a main effect of Response Type (F(3, 42) = 16.47,
MSe = 1.46, p < .001, η2p = .54), and no significant interaction (F(1.8, 25.24) < 1).

A one-way ANOVA showed the same result (F(1, 46) = 1.61, MSe = 528.1, p = .212, η2p = .03), however the
Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test was used because the ANOVA violated the Normality assumption.
15
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Table 18
Descriptive Statistics for Metacognitive Measures at Test (Mean CJs and Response Time in sec)
by Pair Type and Probe Type for Experiment 6.
Pair Type

Hits

False Alarms

Correct

Misses

M (SD)

M (SD)

Rejections

M (SD)

M (SD)
CJs
Concrete

9.07 (0.97)

6.84 (1.95)

8.74 (1.07)

6.65 (1.83)

Abstract

8.33 (1.12)

6.10 (1.96)

7.13 (1.54)

5.75 (1.87)

Concrete

2.73 (0.92)

3.00 (1.31)

3.00 (0.88)

2.79 (0.92)

Abstract

3.29 (0.98)

3.24 (0.96)

3.52 (1.05)

3.54 (1.40)

Response Time

For the main effect of Response Type a post-hoc analysis was done for all comparisons
using paired sample t-tests with a Bonferroni adjustment to the p values. The analysis showed
that Hits were greater than False Alarms (t(15) = -4.31, p = .004, d = 1.08), Hits were greater
than Misses (t(16) = 6.73, p < .001, d = 1.63), Hits were greater than Correct Rejections (t(23) =
-3.86, p = .005, d = 0.79), Correct Rejections were greater than Misses (t(16) = 8.09, p < .001, d
= 1.96), Correct Rejections did not differ from False Alarms (t(15) = 2.91, p = .065, d = 0.73),
and False Alarms did not differ from Misses (t(14) = 1.51, p = .912, d = 0.39). This pattern of
results suggest that participants’ overall CJs were mostly in line with their performance, since for
the majority of trials they gave greater CJs when they were correct than incorrect.
The same ANOVA was run on mean Test Response Time; there was a main effect of Pair
Type (F(1, 14) = 5.8, MSe = 0.5, p = .03, η2p = .29) where Concrete pairs were responded to
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faster than Abstract pairs, no main effect of Response Type (F(3, 42) < 1), and no significant
interaction (F(3, 42) = 1.5, MSe = 0.4, p = .229, η2p = .1).
Performance x Metacognition
To examine the accuracy of JOLs we ran gamma correlations on the delayed-JOLs given
after study and their corresponding performance at test. Both Concrete (M = .45, SD = .38) and
Abstract (M = .33, SD = .33) had low to moderate correlations. To examine the accuracy of CJs
we once again used gamma correlations, but analyzed Intact and Rearranged pairs separately.
For Intact pairs both Concrete (M = .71, SD = .44) and Abstract (M = .72, SD = .27) had
moderate to high correlations, while for Rearranged pairs both Concrete (M = .32, SD = .65) and
Abstract (M = .23, SD = .63) had low correlations.
Discussion
We found a mirror effect, where concrete word pairs had higher hit rates but lower false
alarm rates compared to abstract word pairs, replicating the pattern of associative recognition
performance found in Experiment 2 in Chapter 2. Concrete word pairs also had better
discriminability compared to abstract word pairs. Interestingly, there were no differences
between the two pair types in terms of JOLs or study time allocation. At test, concrete word pairs
were given higher CJs than abstract pairs. Participants gave higher CJs when they were correct
on previously studied word pairs, this corresponds to the high accuracy of CJs on intact word
pairs. CJs remained low for rearranged word pairs. The main finding for this experiment was that
delayed JOLs did improve the absolute accuracy of JOLs compared to immediate JOLs. This is
evident when comparing JOLs given in Experiment 2 from Chapter 2, where concrete pairs had
JOLs that had no correlation to test performance and abstract had low correlations. The inclusion
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of Delayed-JOLs resulted in improved absolute accuracy of concrete pairs to moderate
correlations, while abstract pairs remained low.
General Discussion
The first two experiments presented in this chapter replicated the Concordant Compound
word effect found previously in Experiment 1 of Chapter 2. Compound word pairs had higher hit
rates and higher false alarm rates compared to non-compound word pairs, leading to no
discriminability differences between the two. The addition of a second study-test block
(Experiment 4) or feedback on the first test phase (Experiment 5) did not affect the associative
recognition performance. The addition of a second block only resulted in the response bias for
non-compound word pairs going from no bias to a conservative bias. These results demonstrate
that participants treat compound word pairs and non-compound word pairs consistently even
when given experience with the task and feedback when they are correct or incorrect on the
associative recognition test. Experiment 6 replicated the mirror effect found previously in
Experiment 2 of Chapter 2, where concrete word pairs had higher hit rates and lower false alarm
rates compared to abstract word pairs, which led to better discriminability for concrete word
pairs. This was expected as there was very little change in procedure between these two
experiments.
In terms of the metacognitive measures, participants gave higher JOLs for compound
word pairs than non-compound word pairs indicating that they considered compound word pairs
easier to study. The addition of a second block or feedback had no effects on JOLs. The pattern
for JOLs was reflected in study time allocation, where non-compound word pairs were studied
longer than compound word pairs in Block 1 of Experiment 5, whereas non-compound word
pairs were studied longer than compound word pairs in Block 2 of Experiment 6. This does
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suggest that when given feedback during the first test phase participants decided to give noncompound word pairs more focus when studying, however this did not seem to have any effect in
their performance. For Experiment 6, JOLs and study time allocation showed no differences
between concrete word pairs and abstract word pairs, replicating the finding from Experiment 2
in Chapter 2.
The accuracy of JOLs were low or even zero in some cases for compound word pairs and
non-compound word pairs in Experiments 4 and 5. This finding did not change when participants
were given a second block or feedback, which was expected based on the fact that they did not
change their ratings between block 1 and 2. Experiment 6 demonstrated the consistent finding
that delayed-JOLs improve the accuracy of JOLs. Compared to Experiment 2 in Chapter 2 where
immediate-JOLs for concrete word pairs had no correlation to test performance (M = .074, SD =
.45), the delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs had moderate correlation to test performance (M
= .45, SD = .38). However, the accuracy of immediate- and delayed-JOLs remained the same for
abstract word pairs.
CJs demonstrated a more predictable pattern where compound word pairs had higher CJs
than non-compound word pairs and concrete word pairs had higher CJs than abstract word pairs.
On the other hand, response latencies showed no differences across any of the stimulus
manipulations, however they were generally faster when a response was correct than incorrect
(Experiments 4 and 5). This pattern may have been a result of participants once again showing a
discrepancy between intact and rearranged pairs at test. The fast response latencies for intact
pairs was reflected by the high accuracy of CJs which did not change with a second block or
feedback. For rearranged pairs there was a clear pattern where compound word pairs had close to
zero correlation to test performance, while non-compound word pairs had low to moderate
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correlation to test performance. This pattern did not change with an addition of a second block or
feedback.
Chapter 3 showed that overall performance on an associative recognition test and
metacognitive behavior remained the same when participants were given experience with the
task and when they were given feedback on their performance. While these manipulations failed
to changed participants study behavior, the addition of delayed-JOLs did result in improved
accuracy for JOLs for concrete word pairs. The implication of the findings from all 6
experiments presented in Chapter 1 and 2 will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: General Discussion
This final chapter will summarize the main findings from all 6 experiments presented in
Chapters 2 and 3, then the findings will be discussed in terms of theoretical significance,
followed by practical applications to this research, and finally a conclusion that can be made
from this dissertation. The main purpose of this dissertation was to examine associative
recognition memory from a metacognitive framework. In Chapter 1, the main concepts of
metacognition and associative memory were introduced in order to establish a purpose for the set
of 6 experiments carried out, these concepts included: metacognition, metamemory,
metacognitive measures, associative information, and recognition. The main research question
was whether people display the same metacognitive behaviors when using associative memory
than when using item memory. Chapters 2 and 3 used different approaches to answering this
question but both provided promising ideas that can help our understanding of metamemory for
associative recognition memory.
In Chapter 2, we presented three experiments that examined whether three types of
metacognitive measures changed when the outcome of an associative recognition memory task
was different. Experiment 1 replicated the concordant Compound Word effect (Ahmad &
Hockley, 2014), where compound word pairs had equal discriminability to non-compound word
pairs, but had higher hit rates and higher false alarm rates. Experiment 2 replicated the mirror
effect found for concrete and abstract word pairs (Glanzer & Adams, 1985), where concrete
word pairs had higher hit rates, lower false alarm, and better discriminability than abstract word
pairs. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found another mirror effect where picture pairs had higher hit
rates, lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability than unrelated word pairs. Based on
previous research on the picture superiority effect in associative recognition memory (Hockley,
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2008) we expected to find that picture pairs had better hit rates but equal false alarm rates
compared to unrelated word pairs, this would have provided three unique set of results in which
to compare our metacognitive measures. Regardless, these three experiments still used different
sets of stimuli and provided at least two unique pattern of results from the associative recognition
memory tests.
With the differences found in the performance on the associative recognition test for the
first three experiments, the question remained of whether there would be differences displayed
by the metacognitive measures. In terms of the self-report ratings, JOLs and CJs produced a
pattern of results mostly consistent with what has been found in the metamemory literature. The
relatedness of word pairs was highly influential when making either a JOL or CJ, where higher
related word pairs were given higher ratings compared to lower related word pairs.
Unexpectedly, neither concreteness nor the distinctiveness of pictures pairs influenced JOLs and
only concreteness had an effect on CJs. This was surprising when considering that participants
had better discriminability for concrete word pairs and picture pairs than abstract word pairs and
unrelated word pairs, respectively, which would justify higher confidence at study or at test for
these items; this finding will be discussed further in the metacognitive measures section. We did
find that immediate-JOLs were consistently poor indicators of future performance, as they
always had a low correlation to test performance for all stimuli across all three experiments. In
contrast, CJs consistently showed a high correlation between intact pairs and test performance,
which suggests participants are able to accurately judge their performance on these items.
However, the lowest correlations with test performance were between CJs and rearranged pairs.
This presents an interesting discrepancy between intact and rearranged pairs that may be
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explained by the dual process approach to associative recognition memory and will be discussed
further in a later section.
Study time allocation reflected a compatible pattern of results to JOLs, where higher
confidence in a pair type corresponded with less study time. This was, however, only true for
Experiment 1, where higher related word pairs were studied less than lower related word pairs.
In Experiments 2 and 3 where no differences in JOLs were found, there was also no differences
in study time allocation. This was partially expected, as study time allocation and JOLs are
known to be inversely related (for review see Son & Metcalfe, 2000). If JOLs are considered an
indicator of item difficulty then participants considered unrelated word pairs more difficult than
related word pairs, concrete word pairs as equally difficult as abstract word pairs, and picture
pairs as equally difficult as unrelated word pairs. Participants then allocated more study time to
items deemed more difficult which is in line with the discrepancy reduction model (Dunlosky &
Hertzog, 1998) and the region of proximal learning model (Metcalfe, 2002).
Response latencies were expected to correspond with CJs, just as study time allocation
corresponded with JOLs, however this was not entirely the case. The only difference in response
latencies was between concrete and abstract pairs, where concrete word pairs had shorter
latencies than abstract word pairs. Although, we did find that participants had reliably shorter
response latencies following a hit, which corresponds to their high confidence for intact items.
Response latencies for false alarms, correct rejections, and misses showed no reliable pattern of
results among all three experiments. The potential significance of our findings on study time
allocation and response latencies with respect to overall metacognitive behavior will be
discussed in a later section on response time measures.

92
In Chapter 3, the focus of the experiments shifted away from differences in the
associative memory test and more towards differences in the metacognitive measures. The goal
was to manipulate the procedure of the experiments in order to alter the participants study
behavior or responses at test. In Experiments 4 and 5 a second study-test block was introduced in
order to give participants an opportunity to learn from previous experience, either from the task
itself or from their performance on the task. Experiment 5 specifically examined the latter,
because on the first test participants were given corrective feedback after each response. In
addition, Experiments 4 and 5 were based on Experiment 1 and ended up replicating the results
for that experiment. The results for these two experiments can be summarized succinctly because
the additional study-test block and feedback had no effect on any of the metacognitive measures
or on the outcome of the memory tests.
The final manipulation carried out in Experiment 6 was the substitution of immediate
JOLs for delayed-JOLs, which proved significant. Rather than participants providing a JOL after
studying a single pair, they provided a JOL once all pairs had been studied ensuring a delay
between when a pair was studied and when it’s corresponding JOL was given. Delayed-JOLs
have been found to be more accurately related to memory performance (Nelson & Dunlosky,
1991) than immediate JOLs. While we did not find any difference between immediate JOLs and
delayed-JOLs for abstract word pairs, we did find a difference for concrete word pairs. There
was a considerable increase in accuracy for delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs compared to
immediate JOLs. This finding demonstrates that at least one factor that positively affects
metacognitive behavior for item memory, similarly affects metacognitive behavior for
associative recognition memory.
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Metacognitive Measures
This section will provide some perspective on how the findings from all the
metacognitive measures we used has added to our general understanding of metacognition. One
of the goals of this dissertation was to examine the metacognitive behavior that is used when
participants perform an associative recognition memory task. For that reason we chose
metacognitive measures that encompassed all three stages of the common memory model, which
is outlined in the Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework. During acquisition we included JOLs
(during learning), study time allocation/termination of study (during learning); during retention
we had delayed-JOLs; during retrieval we had confidence judgments (after response output), and
response latencies (termination of memory search). The following subsections will discuss each
metacognitive measure individually.
Judgments of Learning
As one of the most commonly implemented metacognitive judgments for memory
research, JOLs have been studied under many conditions. They are typically measured item-byitem (e.g., Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011) or as global ratings (e.g., a single JOL for each
category of items; Tauber et al., 2019) and are self-reported judgments of the likelihood that an
item will be remembered at some point in the future. Based on previous findings, we know JOLs
are highly sensitive to stimulus manipulations. For instance, participants gave higher JOLs for
words with high frequency compared to low frequency words (for a review see Fiacconi &
Dollois, 2020) and they gave higher JOLs for words in large font than in small font (Rhodes &
Castel, 2008). More importantly for our experiments, participants gave higher JOLs for concrete
words than abstract words (Witherby & Tauber, 2017), and they gave higher JOLs for related
word pairs than unrelated word pairs (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). Based on these findings we
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expected that all of the immediate JOLs implemented in 5 of our experiments would show
differences between the different types of stimuli. Surprisingly, we only found a difference in
JOLs for related and unrelated word pairs. According to cue-utilization theory (Koriat, 1997), the
differences in stimuli are an intrinsic cue which should have affected how participants based
their JOLs, however this would not be the case if a conflicting mnemonic cue was used by the
participants. For instance, if participants had the belief that there is no difference between
studying concrete word pairs and abstract word pairs, then they would not treat those two types
of pairs differently.
This conclusion is unlikely because Witherby and Tauber (2017) examined the effect of
concreteness on JOLs over six experiments and found a consistent effect where concrete words
were given higher JOLs than abstract words. Moreover, they concluded that this effect was due
to a belief by the participants that concrete words would be more likely to be remembered than
abstract words. The difference in Witherby and Tauber’s study and the experiments carried out
for this dissertation was that word pairs were used not single words. One possibility that could
explain these different findings is that when participants study word pairs they do not perceive a
benefit of concreteness for generating or retaining associative information. Another possibility is
that participants may believe that the strategy they used to generate an association between two
items was equally as effective for concrete pairs as it was for abstract pairs. Future studies could
examine participants’ strategy choice more closely, which may give insight into determining
whether participants’ JOLs for word pairs with varying levels of concreteness are influenced by
beliefs about the cues or participants’ mnemonic abilities.
While it was unexpected that concreteness had no effect on JOLs for word pairs, it was
even more surprising that JOLs for picture pairs were equivalent to unrelated word pairs. It
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should be noted, however, there is much less known about how participants rate their memory
for pictures and no study as far as I am aware has compared JOLs for pictures (or picture pairs)
and words (or word pairs). A few studies have found that specific properties of pictures influence
JOL ratings, such as emotional valence (Hourihan & Bursey, 2017), stimulus size (Undorf et al.,
2017), and color (Undorf & Broder, 2021). It has also been established that there is a picture
superiority effect for associative recognition memory (Hockley, 2008) where picture pairs have
higher hit rates, equal or lower false alarm rates, and better discriminability than unrelated word
pairs. Therefore, the finding that JOLs were the same for picture pairs and unrelated word pairs
suggests that participants failed to perceive the benefit of pictures over words. Similar to
concreteness, this finding may be explained by an erroneous belief that learning associative
information for pictures is the same as learning associative information for words. While
researchers have not been able to explain why the picture superiority effect occurs, our findings
presents another question which is why participants seem unaware of the benefit of pictures over
words.
Mean JOL ratings represent a general notion of how confident participants are in
remembering study material. This type of measure provides insight on the factors that influence
study behavior or fail to have an effect. An alternative inference that metacognitive researchers
make is the correlation between a JOL rating and its corresponding outcome at test, which is
considered a measure of resolution, or relative accuracy (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Throughout the
first five experiments we consistently found that an item’s immediate JOL had a low correlation
to its corresponding outcome at test. This is in line with previous work on immediate JOLs
where relative accuracy, as measured by gamma correlation, are at best moderate (Rhodes &
Tauber, 2011). Considering the findings previously described, where JOLs were not reflective of

96
performance for word pairs of varying levels of relatedness, levels of concreteness, and picture
pairs versus word pairs, the low accuracy of immediate JOLs was not surprising. Overall, the set
of results we obtained, along with previous studies, suggests that participants fail to correctly
assess study cues when making immediate JOLs.
Before discussing the reason why this might occur, I will first explain the results of the
delayed-JOL measure implemented in Experiment 6. Delayed-JOLs have been widely found to
increase the relative accuracy of JOL ratings (for review see Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). The
delayed-JOL effect had previously been reported with recall tests of paired associates, where a
delayed-JOL was prompted using only the cue (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). When participants
are provided a cue they can use their familiarity or recollection of the cue as a basis for their
JOLs, or they can attempt to retrieve the target and base their JOL on their ability to retrieve or
not retrieve the target (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Because of the nature of the associative
recognition test, the procedure for prompting delayed-JOLs can change from presenting only the
cue to presenting both the cue and the target (i.e., both words in a pair), which was the case for
Experiment 6. Therefore, neither cue-familiarity nor target retrievability would explain the
improvements in the accuracy for delayed-JOLs.
Some researchers (e.g., Spellman & Bjork, 1992) consider the delayed-JOL effect a result
of additional study practice, similar to testing effects (Dunlosky et al., 2013). One finding that
would support this idea is if JOLs, or other metacognitive judgments, provided a benefit to recall
or recognition performance. Our results showed that delayed-JOLs did not affect performance on
the associative recognition test; however, there have been studies that found that JOLs do affect
recall (Serra & Dunlosky, 2005). If delayed-JOLs are not simply a reflection of additional study
then how can their effects on relative accuracy be explained? One possibility is that immediate
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JOLs are based on short-term memory (STM), while delayed-JOLs are based on long-term
memory (LTM). This was the original explanation proposed by Nelson and Dunlosky (1991)
when they first introduced delayed-JOLs, and remains the best supported by the data. This is
exemplified by the finding in Experiment 6 where only the delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs
showed improvement, while those for abstract word pairs did not. This makes sense because
concrete word pairs were in fact easier to recognize than abstract word pairs, as shown in the
results on the associative recognition test, and therefore LTM is better for concrete word pairs
than abstract word pairs. It would be of interest for future research to carry on the exploration of
delayed-JOLs for associative memory in order to gain more insight into what factors improve
JOL accuracy.
Confidence Judgments
As oppose to JOLs, which are measured during study and correspond to the acquisition
process of memory, CJs are measured at test and correspond to the retrieval process of memory.
Throughout all of our experiments there were a number of results regarding CJs that provide
potential insight into the retrieval process for associative recognition memory. First, stimulus
manipulation had an inconsistent effect on mean CJs. In terms of relatedness, participants only
had an increase in confidence for high strength word pairs compared to compound word pairs,
low strength word pairs, and unrelated word pairs. The fact that compound word pairs were
given the same CJs as low strength word pairs and unrelated word pairs is surprising, given that
previous research has found effects of relatedness on JOLs (Mueller et al., 2013). One possible
explanation for these results is that only during the test did participants notice the difficulty of
discriminating between old and new compound word pairs which caused their confidence to
decrease. Another factor that needs to be considered is the process used to identify these word
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pairs at test, according to dual-process theory compound word pairs would suffer from an
increased reliance on familiarity which is less accurate than recollection (Ahmad & Hockley,
2014). It follows that CJs based on familiarity would be lower than CJs based on recollection.
This would explain why participants’ confidence in remembering compound word pairs
seemingly decrease from study to test. The relation between CJs and associative recognition
memory will be considered more closely in the next section.
The other two stimulus manipulations resulted in two opposing pattern of results. For the
first case, participants were more confident in concrete word pairs than abstract word pairs. This
corresponds well with test performance in which concrete word pairs had better discriminability
than abstract word pairs. However, for the second case participants were equally confident in
picture pairs and unrelated word pairs. This did not match their test performance where picture
pairs had better discriminability than unrelated word pairs. These results suggest certain stimuli
can affect performance without affecting confidence. The increased confidence for concrete
word pairs may be explained by generalizing the finding that participants believe that concrete
words are easier to remember than abstract words (Witherby & Tauber, 2017) to the idea that
participants consider concrete items easier to remember than abstract items. A way to confirm
this notion would be by replicating Witherby and Tauber’s (2017) study but with word pairs to
see if beliefs about concreteness are the same for word pairs as they are for single words. At
present, it remains unclear why concreteness affects metacognitive judgments at study differently
than metacognitive judgments at test. Other questions remain as well, such as why the benefit of
pictures over words had no effect on JOLs or CJs? At the moment, we can only conclude that
stimulus characteristics have varying effects on different metacognitive judgments.
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One of the predictions for CJs was that they would be greater for item types that had
better performance in terms of discriminability, for instance, picture pairs should have higher CJs
than unrelated word pairs. This prediction was based on the assumption that participants can
accurately assess when their responses are correct or incorrect. What we found is that the
accuracy of CJs was actually dependent on the type of test item, where intact pairs showed very
high accuracy and rearranged pairs showed very low accuracy. This finding corresponds to the
pattern of results for mean CJs, which were shown to be consistent throughout all six
experiments. For intact pairs participants gave the highest CJs following a hit, and the lowest CJs
following a miss, which demonstrate good metacognitive monitoring. Whereas for rearranged
pairs, participants CJs were no different following a false alarm than following a correct
rejection, which demonstrates poor metacognitive monitoring.
This finding is in line with the dual-process theory of recognition memory, where
participants use familiarity as a fast initial method of responding to a test pair but they need to
use a slower, more accurate method of retrieving specific details of a previous event in order to
reject novel items that may seem familiar (Rotello & Heit, 2000). Since intact trials are
composed of two items which were previously paired together during study, familiarity with
either one item, both, or the association is equally sufficient to recognize that trial as old or new.
The low accuracy of CJs for rearranged trials would suggest that participants failed to use a
recall-to-reject process, because if they did then you would expect a much greater degree of
accuracy between their CJs and their performance on the test. An interesting idea that might
change the accuracy of CJs is if participants’ motivation to use recall-to-reject was increased, for
instance by providing an incentive to achieve a better performance on rearranged pairs at test.
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Reaction Time Measures
The two reaction time measures, included in all six experiments, are similar to JOLs and
CJs in terms of relying on different processes. During study we looked at participants’ reaction
times in order to determine whether they allocate study time differently depending on the type of
stimuli. We found that participants allocated more study time to unrelated word pairs compared
to compound word pairs, this corresponds to the pattern of results for JOLs. As was mentioned in
the previous section on JOLs, self-paced study time is considered to be based on fluency, either
processing or encoding (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005), where items that take longer to study are
considered more difficult to learn and less likely to be remembered. So, our findings replicated
previous results from cued-recall studies (e.g., Koriat et al., 2006) where an increase in study
time corresponds with a decrease in confidence. We did not find this for low strength word pairs,
which were studied for the same amount of time as compound word pairs and high strength word
pairs, but were given lower JOLs, however there was a non-significant trend where low strength
word pairs were given more study time.
The results of study time allocation were surprising for both concrete pairs versus
abstract pairs and picture pairs versus word pairs. There were no difference in study time
between concrete word pairs and abstract word pairs, nor was there a difference between picture
pairs and unrelated word pairs. Considering test performance, it was expected that participants
would allocate more study time to abstract word pairs and unrelated word pairs since they had
more difficulty with these items. These results do, however, correspond to the pattern of results
for JOLs, where there were also no differences between pair types. In general, these
corresponding pattern of results for study time and JOLs supports the idea that these measures
are based on similar cues, one of which is likely encoding fluency (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005).
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One way to examine this idea further would be to explore participants’ strategy choice.
Participants might believe that the associative information formed for concrete word pairs and
picture pairs is different than the item information, in which case their study strategy should
reflect a difference for how they study single items and pairs of items. It would also be expected
that participants would use the same strategy for concrete word pairs as abstract word pairs and
for picture pairs as unrelated word pairs. Based on the current results, it seems that participants
study these word pair types the same way.
For the test phase we looked at participants’ reaction times in order to determine what
conditions would lead to faster or slower responding. We only found differences in response
latencies for concrete and abstract word pairs, where concrete word pairs had shorter latencies
than abstract word pairs. This particular finding corresponds well with the pattern of results for
CJs where concrete word pairs were given higher CJs than abstract word pairs. Because response
latencies are considered a measure of retrieval fluency (Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005) then these
results would suggest that higher CJs are given for items that are retrieved quickly. This also
corresponds well to our results for picture pairs versus unrelated word pairs, which had no
differences in response latencies and no differences in CJs. However, we found that high strength
word pairs were given higher CJs than either compound word pairs or low strength pairs, but
there were no differences in response latencies between these three pair types. These results
suggest that there may be other factors, besides retrieval fluency, that are contributing to CJs.
The next section will discuss why making CJs for associative recognition tasks seems to differ
from previous CJ findings which were primarily done with cued recall.
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Associative Recognition Memory from a Metacognitive Perspective
This section will address the main purpose of this dissertation, which was to gain a better
understanding of metamemory, specifically, in relation to associative recognition memory.
Considering the differences between recognition and recall (Humphreys, 1976), as well as
associative memory and item memory (Buchler et al., 2008; Cohn & Moscovitch, 2007), the
results from the six experiments presented in Chapters 2 and 3 provide novel findings for
metamemory for associative recognition. Three topics will be addressed: what findings were
unique to our paradigm, how is metamemory for item information different than associative
information, and what do our results suggest about the use of dual processes in associative
recognition memory.
The main difference with our experiments and previous research on paired-associates is
that we used a recognition test with intact and rearranged pairs, which is considered a relatively
pure test of associative memory (Humphreys, 1976) as opposed to, for instance, cued recall. This
recognition test provides an opportunity to examine dual process theory, because rearranged
pairs cannot be solely recognized using item familiarity because both items in a rearranged pair
had previously been studied. Only a few studies have examined metacognitive judgments with an
associative recognition test, however the primary focus of those studies was to determine the
influence of metacognition on future study behavior for older and younger adults (Hertzog et al.,
2013; Hines et al., 2009; Hines et al., 2015). Due to procedural differences only two findings are
comparable between these previous studies and our experiments. First, we replicated the finding
that immediate JOLs have low relative accuracy in predicting performance on an associative
recognition memory test. Second, we found the same discrepancy in CJs for intact and
rearranged word pairs, where CJs had a high correlation with response accuracy for intact word
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pairs and had a low correlation with response accuracy for rearranged trials. The other pattern of
results we found for JOLs, study time allocation, CJs, and response latencies have not been
previously reported.
In terms of study measures, we found that both JOLs and study time allocation are
influenced by encoding fluency, but it is not the only factor. Both cue-utilization theory (Koriat,
1997) and analytic-processing (AP) theory (Mueller et al., 2016) propose that participants’
beliefs in how a cue will affect their memory plays an important role in determining their
monitoring accuracy during study. Based on our results, it seems that participants have different
beliefs on how concreteness, for example, affects item memory versus associative memory but
their beliefs on how relatedness is the same for item versus associative memory. Alternatively,
processing fluency can also explain our results because differences in study time allocation,
which serve as a measure of encoding fluency, corresponded to differences in JOLs. Future
studies could determine which explanation has more validity by either eliminating the benefit of
processing fluency during study or by examining participants’ beliefs about how stimulus
characteristics will affect their memory for associations.
The results for the test measures poses some questions for the currently accepted
explanations for CJs. The most frequent explanation for the basis of CJs is that they use retrieval
fluency, both the accessibility of a target item and the latency for when a target is retrieved
(Dougherty et al., 2005). For an associate recognition paradigm the influence of retrieval fluency
is reduced to just the latency of when an item pair was recognized. As a measure of retrieval
fluency, we looked at response latencies and found that for some cases, like concreteness,
retrieval fluency corresponded with CJs where participants had higher confidence when response
latencies were shorter. However, we also found contradicting evidence, such as for compound
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word pairs, where participants had higher confidence for these pairs but there were no
differences in response latencies. It is likely that for stimuli with different levels of relatedness,
like compound word pairs and non-compound word pairs, participants’ confidence was driven by
whether the test pair was old or new.
The differences in CJs for related pairs versus unrelated pairs might be because of
participants’ overreliance on familiarity as a process for identifying both old and new pairs at
test. The likelihood of participants using familiarity during the associative recognition test is
supported by two findings. First, the concordant effects present in three of our experiments
demonstrated that an increase in hits for highly related word pairs was accompanied by an
increase in false alarms. The increased familiarity of highly related word pairs is only beneficial
for old pair types, where recognition of either item in the pair can be used to make a correct
response. Familiarity is unreliable for new pairs because both items have a degree of familiarity.
Then, if participants rely on familiarity we would expect that they would perform better on old
pairs and perform worse on new pairs, which is what we found for compound word pairs.
The second result that suggest participants relied on familiarity is their criterion
placements. A participant’s criterion displays their level of bias towards responding to any test
pair as old. Highly related word pairs consistently showed a liberal bias which means
participants overestimated the proportion of old related word pairs at test because they seemed
familiar. The increase reliance on familiarity also explains why participants were more confident
in their responses for related word pairs compared to unrelated word pairs. Additionally, if
participants use a recollection process for rearranged pairs, then we would expect their response
latencies to be longer for these pairs because recollection takes longer to perform than the
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familiarity process, but this was not what we found. Ultimately, the overall pattern of results for
relatedness supports the dual process theory of associative recognition memory.
The experiments in Chapter 3 were then designed to improve metacognitive monitoring
with changes in the procedure. Experiment 4 and 5 both failed to achieve this, as neither adding a
second study-test block nor providing feedback during the test phase resulted in any meaningful
changes in study behavior or the pattern of results on the associative recognition tests. Previous
studies have shown that if participants are provided with a second learning opportunity with a
second study-test block and the stimuli remain the same, then participants show changes in JOLs,
CJs, and study time (Hertzog et al., 2013; Hines et al., 2015). However, because we used
different stimuli for the second study-test block participants could only learn from their
experience with the task and with feedback on a previously similar test. This suggests that in this
case participants are not transferring what they learned from past experiences to a new but
similar situation. Future studies might be able to examine this finding more closely by making
the similarities between the two study-test blocks more explicitly known to the participants (e.g.,
pointing out the differences in performance between two different word pair types).
The results for Experiments 4 and 5 regarding experience and feedback both found major
null effects, however there were also numerous other null effects outlined in the other
experiments for study time, JOLs, CJs, and response latencies. One potential limitation to this
research is that there was not enough power to find some of these effects. For instance, in
Experiment 4 of Witherby and Tauber (2017) there was a small effect of concreteness on JOLs
where JOLs were higher for concrete words compared to abstract words (d = .18). We ran a
power analysis to estimate how large a sample size would be needed to obtain such a small effect
size and found that well over 350 participants would be required. However, it should be noted

106
that we had enough power to detect significant effects for all of our recognition memory
manipulations as well as numerous metamemory measures. Part of the issue with self-reported
metamemory ratings is the large individual variability in responses (Kantner & Dobbins, 2019),
this makes it difficult to detect potential group differences for these measures. Regardless, future
studies should examine the issue of power and sample sizes more closely when using these types
of measures.
Applications of Research
Metacognitive research has many real world applications, particularly for students,
because it often reveals a misconception between how people perceive their own learning and
how they actually learn. Our finding that immediate JOLs are quite inaccurate serves as a prime
example of a situation where people are unable to monitor their learning progress. However, the
findings from metacognitive research has helped teaching instructors to better understand why
students sometimes develop ineffective study behaviors. In this section I will review some of the
ways our research can be applied to students’ learning behavior, including: when they terminate
study, how their confidence fluctuates, and how they can improve their metacognitive accuracy.
When participants initially engage with the study material presented during the first phase
of an experiment they have to determine the parameters of the task. Some parameters may be
given to them with instructions, such as how many items they need to learn to pass the
experiment, other parameters need to be determined by the participant, such as determining the
difficulty of each item. Ultimately, these parameters help the participant know when to terminate
their study of each item. What we found is that participants take into account the characteristics
of the study material but are not able to determine how different characteristics will affect their
learning. They considered related word pairs, such as compound words, to be easy to remember,
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when in reality they lead to high rates of false alarms. Similarly, they thought concrete word
pairs were equally difficult to learn as abstract word pairs, when concrete word pairs are actually
easier to discriminate than abstract word pairs. Even when participants studied picture pairs and
unrelated word pairs, which are quite noticeably different, they studied them the same way even
though picture pairs are much easier to discriminate than word pairs. One takeaway from this
research for instructors is that students have difficulty knowing what will affect their learning
even if they are able to notice differences in the study material.
A large portion of metacognitive research looks directly at participants’ confidence levels
through self-reported ratings. In our research we looked at JOLs and CJs, but there are many
other rating measures that similarly gauge participants’ confidence in their own learning (e.g.,
Feeling-of-knowing judgments; Chua & Solinger, 2015). The purpose of this line of research is
to find out the factors that affect participants’ confidence but perhaps do not affect their actual
learning. One factor that was just described is the characteristics of the study material, which
differentially affect confidence and performance. Another factor is the different time points of
the learning processes. When participants were studying they were not able to optimize their
learning because they did not understand how the differences in the study material would affect
them. During the test participants failed to evaluate the difficulty of identifying new rearranged
pairs, especially for word pairs that were highly related like compound word pairs. Although
participants did indicate that they had lower confidence when responding to rearranged pairs,
they did not change the way they handled these pairs in comparison with intact pairs. Regardless
of the reason for this happening, it indicates that participants will fail to adapt their behavior
under different conditions when no guidance is given.
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In terms of how the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments can be improved we
have a number of suggestions based on our findings. First, we must point out two situations that
do not seem to affect metacognitive behavior. We first examined whether the lack of experience
with an associative recognition memory task was causing problems for the participants. We
found that giving participants experience with the task, by including another study-test block, did
not change any of the metacognitive measures or performance. Therefore, we concluded that
experience with the task by itself is not enough to change participants learning behavior. We then
provided participants with feedback on whether their responses on the test were correct or
incorrect, as well as the inclusion of a second study-test block. Ultimately, this still failed to have
an effect on any of our measures, which once again suggests a difficulty for participant in
adapting their study behavior on their own.
The last attempt we made to improve metacognitive accuracy did work, at least partially.
When asked to give delayed-JOLs for abstract word pairs, there was an increase in relative
accuracy compared to when participants were asked to give immediate-JOLs. It has been
speculated that delayed-JOLs are a result of participants changing the basis of their JOLs from
STM to LTM (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). That would only partially explain our findings,
because we did not see improved accuracy for delayed-JOLs for concrete word pairs which were
given under the same conditions as delayed-JOLs for abstract word pairs. An alternative
explanation is that metacognitive judgments at study are more accurate when they are taken
under conditions that resemble the conditions at test (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1997). In this case, the
prompt for delayed-JOLs are quite similar to the prompt at test, where previously studied word
pairs are presented again after some time had passed. The problem still remains that abstract
word pairs and concrete word pairs were taken under equivalent conditions but produced
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different results. Therefore, if we want to recommend to students that a useful strategy to judge
their learning is to wait for a delay after initially learning, then we need to further explore the
conditions where this strategy produces beneficial results.
Conclusion
Human memory is a fundamental, but complex, system that allows people to store and
retrieve information from a past experience. A developing area of research on metamemory
explores the interaction between higher order functions, such as reasoning and introspection, and
memory. The research presented in this dissertation was done in order to better understand the
relation between metacognition and associative recognition memory. While previous research
had been done on the metacognitive measures we employed (JOLs, CJs, study time allocation,
and response latencies), there were not many studies that used these measures with an associative
recognition task. We replicated three findings for associative memory: first, a concordant effect
for compound word pairs, second a mirror effect for concreteness, and third a mirror effect for
picture pairs versus word pairs. When we examined the metacognitive measures under these
three different patterns of results, we found that participants struggled to correctly use cues, such
as stimulus characteristics, to their advantage when judging their performance. They
overestimated the usefulness of some factors, like the level of relatedness between two pairs,
while underestimating other factors, like the benefit of pictures over words. Our attempts to
improve metacognitive accuracy or correct study behavior was only partially successful when we
introduced delayed-JOLs instead of immediate JOLs. However, this does suggest that strategies
that have been previously found to improve metacognitive accuracy for other types of memory
may also be beneficial for associative recognition memory.
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APPENDIX A
List of Abbreviations
JOLs

Judgments of Learning

CJs

Confidence Judgments (sometimes referred to as RCJs in the literature for
Retrospective Confidence Judgments)

EOLs

Ease-of-Learning Judgments

WF

Word Frequency

AP-Theory

Analytic-Processing Theory

FOK

Feeling-of-Knowing Judgments

MPT

Memory for Past Tests

HR

Hit Rate

FAR

False Alarm Rate

CW

Compound Word

NCW

Non-Compound Word

STM

Short-Term Memory

LTM

Long-Term Memory
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APPENDIX B
Stimuli for Experiment 1
Study list
Compound word pairs
candle
wax

High strength word pairs
below
above

Low strength word pairs
brother
sibling

slap

stick

beneath

under

stranger

relative

eye

sight

autumn

fall

crisp

sharp

whip

lash

rake

leaves

mouth

dry

finger

tip

author

writer

disgrace

upset

thumb

nail

read

book

deny

regret

grape

vine

croak

frog

garden

pretty

passion

fruit

live

die

spaghetti

tomato

hair

brush

cigar

smoke

idea

mind

crew

cut

cigarette

lighter

request

suggestion

heart

break

cent

money

loud

sound

drum

beat

copper

penny

lonely

silence

hedge

row

dozen

twelve

movie

video

wart

hog

bacon

eggs

stare

watch

moon

shine

decade

ten

pain

pleasure

lime

light

month

year

body

head

neck

tie

granite

stone

power

volt

shoe

lace

boulder

rock

elegant

prestige

nut

cracker

near

close

scenery

nice

clam

shell

distant

far

theater

stage

snow

plow

mink

fur

student

tough
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moth

ball

jacket

coat

question

test

steam

roller

pail

bucket

theme

subject

tug

boat

pool

water

number

name

pass

port

estimate

guess

stink

sewer

band

wagon

here

there

perish

burn

jail

bird

insane

crazy

opinion

bad

blow

torch

lost

found

hat

box

hail

storm

pencil

pen

ease

complex

bull

fight

pony

horse

enrage

calm

stove

pipe

spades

cards

cloth

clean

tea

cup

spoiled

rotten

canvas

green

sheep

dog

uncle

aunt

appear

become

wall

flower

university

college

absurd

funny

store

keep

slumber

party

throw

move

hen

house

rest

sleep

violent

hit

tooth

paste

tote

bag

time

slow

ear

ache

haul

carry

list

schedule

Test list
Compound word pairs

High strength word pairs

Low strength word pairs

Rearranged word pairs
candle

stick

below

under

brother

relative

eye

lash

autumn

leaves

crisp

dry

finger

nail

author

book

disgrace

regret

grape

fruit

croak

die

garden

tomato
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hair

cut

cigar

cigarette

idea

suggestion

heart

beat

cent

penny

loud

silence

hedge

hog

dozen

eggs

movie

watch

moon

light

decade

year

pain

head

neck

lace

granite

rock

power

prestige

nut

shell

near

far

scenery

stage

snow

ball

mink

coat

student

test

steam

boat

pail

water

theme

name

Intact word pairs
pass

port

estimate

guess

stink

sewer

band

wagon

here

there

perish

burn

jail

bird

insane

crazy

opinion

bad

blow

torch

lost

found

hat

box

hail

storm

pencil

pen

ease

complex

bull

fight

pony

horse

enrage

calm

stove

pipe

spades

cards

cloth

clean

tea

cup

spoiled

rotten

canvas

green

sheep

dog

uncle

aunt

appear

become

wall

flower

university

college

absurd

funny

store

keep

slumber

party

throw

move

hen

house

rest

sleep

violent

hit
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Stimuli for Experiments 2 and 6
Study list
Abstract word pairs
failure

goddess

Concrete word pairs
olive

squirrel

malice

impulse

herring

pony

assent

attempt

pillow

orange

perry

forecast

stomach

rocket

nonsense

mercy

pliers

penny

extreme

unrest

cereal

tiger

outset

surprise

bedroom

skylark

instance

outcome

turtle

kettle

motive

panic

liquor

puppy

devil

torment

candy

cedar

fetish

paean

kennel

mackerel

neglect

hatred

basket

tulip

beauty

gallant

ceiling

ribbon

duty

glory

chestnut

cabbage

delight

defence

spider

piano

nadir

excise

indian

sugar

deceit

safety

saddle

jersey

context

wisdom

canoe

hatchet

hygiene

merit

forearm

jacket

pique

lament

whiskey

cotton

zero

appeal

cider

walnut

craven

frenzy

robin

dentist

extra

axiom

cancer

button
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dogma

upkeep

mirror

bagpipe

courage

mister

sofa

belly

neuter

coulomb

bracelet

necklace

tribute

parry

blanket

gravy

horror

stoic

rabbit

soda

dais

virtue

tortoise

cherry

hazard

danger

lily

garlic

pardon

demon

walrus

pickle

heaven

distress

rifle

eagle

forfeit

terror

cattle

pencil

escape

recall

elbow

pigeon

debut

triumph

lion

ankle

conquest

honour

lantern

helmet

content

revenge

butter

balloon

rating

concept

puddle

trumpet

upright

tenure

lemon

carrot

success

upset

liver

coffee

anger

disgrace

pedal

manure

excuse

folly

otter

cannon

envy

concert

basin

chicken

aspect

transfer

onion

needle

suffix

havoc

haddock

bandage
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Test list
Abstract word pairs

Concrete word pairs
Rearranged word pairs

failure

axiom

olive

sugar

malice

frenzy

herring

soda

assent

mister

pillow

hatchet

perry

danger

stomach

bagpipe

nonsense

wisdom

pliers

belly

extreme

merit

cereal

button

outset

safety

bedroom

cherry

instance

stoic

turtle

cotton

motive

coulomb

liquor

garlic

devil

excise

candy

gravy

fetish

upkeep

kennel

dentist

neglect

virtue

basket

jacket

beauty

appeal

ceiling

necklace

duty

parry

chestnut

jersey

delight

lament

spider

walnut

Intact word pairs
pardon

demon

walrus

pickle

heaven

distress

rifle

eagle

forfeit

terror

cattle

pencil

escape

recall

elbow

pigeon

debut

triumph

lion

ankle

conquest

honour

lantern

helmet
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content

revenge

butter

balloon

rating

concept

puddle

trumpet

upright

tenure

lemon

carrot

success

upset

liver

coffee

anger

disgrace

pedal

manure

excuse

folly

otter

cannon

envy

concert

basin

chicken

aspect

transfer

onion

needle

suffix

havoc

haddock

bandage

Stimuli for Experiments 4 and 5
Study list
Compound word pairs

Non-Compound word pairs
Block 1

candle

wax

dare

poverty

slap

stick

lean

peel

eye

sight

egg

anchor

whip

lash

agency

shiny

finger

tip

pie

sofa

thumb

nail

frame

trip

grape

vine

capsule

fantasy

passion

fruit

filth

chicken

hair

brush

chew

brief

crew

cut

taste

basket

heart

break

scene

finance
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drum

beat

mantle

insult

hedge

row

cash

shallow

wart

hog

author

mansion

moon

shine

worse

soft

lime

light

cheese

holiday

neck

tie

organ

monkey

shoe

lace

far

whiff

nut

cracker

wreck

coil

clam

shell

cold

foul

snow

plow

captain

union

moth

ball

satin

planet

steam

roller

stare

role

tug

boat

blue

breast

check

list

builder

ride

needle

point

zipper

till

child

birth

bribe

tragedy

brother

hood

tree

chisel

flag

pole

vault

angel

friend

ship

profit

wide

pass

port

shawl

moment

band

wagon

race

gang

jail

bird

racquet

attack

snake

skin

plant

flame

hail

storm

monarch

womb

bull

fight

small

cannon
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stove

pipe

card

slice

tea

cup

corps

column

sheep

dog

earn

hunger

wall

flower

sheet

ring

store

keep

wolf

outcome

hen

house

havoc

history

leap

frog

liver

rural

sand

man

copper

brawl

air

stream

magnet

bred

Block 2
cross

road

cabinet

brim

rain

bow

system

fourth

earth

quake

ulcer

aisle

silk

worm

parcel

vase

pin

stripe

loan

rich

pot

hole

match

science

saw

horse

order

bargain

thread

mill

rum

rose

star

dust

broom

wonder

sword

fish

cider

text

stock

yard

utter

raise

pawn

broker

oil

jelly

sun

set

ferry

speech

ink

spot

branch

sponge

sweat

shop

web

crook
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tee

shirt

math

toy

foot

rest

haze

graft

bar

stool

none

spell

witch

hunt

farther

growth

space

craft

meek

little

gold

finch

sail

student

lock

smith

canoe

economy

hand

shake

phone

links

saddle

bag

million

winter

war

path

ham

sewer

fan

fare

remark

finish

side

kick

idle

upright

cat

walk

wick

over

head

dress

many

puppy

gem

stone

place

trout

sound

track

wizard

collar

arm

pit

locker

heat

lady

like

rat

poster

back

pack

dream

narrow

law

maker

stew

factory

life

saver

scotch

coral

bath

robe

fault

ashamed

black

mail

brave

juice

news

letter

rush

spear

tail

spin

honesty

dawn
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book

shelf

defence

mash

night

mare

ripe

smack

death

wish

object

hill

play

thing

poll

bible

door

step

want

reward

Test list
Compound word pairs

Non-Compound word pairs
Block 1
Rearranged

candle

stick

dare

peel

eye

lash

egg

shiny

finger

nail

pie

trip

grape

fruit

capsule

chicken

hair

cut

chew

basket

heart

beat

scene

insult

hedge

hog

cash

mansion

moon

light

worse

holiday

neck

lace

organ

whiff

nut

shell

wreck

foul

snow

ball

captain

planet

steam

boat

stare

breast

check

point

builder

till

child

hood

bribe

chisel

flag

ship

vault

wide

Intact
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pass

port

shawl

moment

band

wagon

race

gang

jail

bird

racquet

attack

snake

skin

plant

flame

hail

storm

monarch

womb

bull

fight

small

cannon

stove

pipe

card

slice

tea

cup

corps

column

sheep

dog

earn

hunger

wall

flower

sheet

ring

store

keep

wolf

outcome

hen

house

havoc

history

leap

frog

liver

rural

sand

man

copper

brawl

air

stream

magnet

bred

Block 2
Rearranged
cross

bow

cabinet

fourth

earth

worm

ulcer

vase

pin

hole

loan

science

saw

mill

order

rose

star

fish

broom

text

stock

broker

utter

jelly

sun

spot

ferry

sponge

sweat

shirt

web

toy
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foot

stool

haze

spell

witch

craft

farther

little

gold

smith

sail

economy

hand

bag

phone

winter

war

fare

ham

finish

side

walk

idle

over

head

stone

many

trout

Intact
sound

track

wizard

collar

arm

pit

locker

heat

lady

like

rat

poster

back

pack

dream

narrow

law

maker

stew

factory

life

saver

scotch

coral

bath

robe

fault

ashamed

black

mail

brave

juice

news

letter

rush

spear

tail

spin

honesty

dawn

book

shelf

defence

mash

night

mare

ripe

smack

death

wish

object

hill

play

thing

poll

bible

door

step

want

reward

